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Prosecutors have a significant but unrecognized constitutional role in our criminal justice system 
to prevent juries from discriminating based upon the race or gender of the victim.  The 
prosecutorial role to “do justice” includes the crucial responsibility to provide true equal protection 
of the law, yet prosecutors lack the constitutional tools they need for the job.  This article argues 
that defendants’ constitutional procedural rights to root out unlawful jury discrimination should 
also be made available to prosecutors.  From the acquittal of the police officers who beat up Rodney 
King on videotape to acquittals in countless rape cases with “imperfect” victims, prosecutors often 
lose battles against discriminatory acquittal because they lack any constitutional weapons for the 
fight.  While the Supreme Court has created several different procedural remedies to prevent jury 
discrimination against defendants, the Court has never given prosecutors the equivalent 
constitutional language to enforce their own equal protection role.   
Specifically, prosecutors should share the defendant’s constitutional right to voir dire jurors about 
their potential prejudices.  Voir dire on juror bias is an imperfect but crucial procedural protection 
that has received very little scholarly attention.  Currently, the Supreme Court allows defendants a 
very narrow right to voir dire about racism only when race will clearly be at issue in the case.  This 
article concludes that both prosecutors and defendants should have a constitutional right to root 
out unlawful discrimination during jury selection through voir dire, and that right should apply 
in every case.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The popular image of the heroic lawyer battling jury discrimina-
tion is that of the criminal defense lawyer, an Atticus Finch 
representing a black client before an all-white jury.1  We tend not to 
remember the other brave lawyers, the prosecutors who charged 
lynchings and hate crimes despite the near-certainty of an acquittal 
from a racist jury.  From the trials of defendants charged with killing 
Emmett Till and beating Rodney King, to domestic violence and rape 
cases, prosecutors frequently fight jury discrimination against minori-
ty and female victims.2
 
 1 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
  Yet prosecutors have no constitutional proce-
 2 See generally M. SUSAN ORR-KLOPFER, THE EMMETT TILL BOOK (2005) (describing a case in 
which state prosecutors brought two white defendants to trial for the lynching of Emmett 
Till, a fifteen-year-old black boy who whistled at a white woman; subsequently an all-white 
jury acquitted the defendants, after which the defendants were free to brag about the 
murder with protection from double jeopardy); REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991), available at 
http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/1%20-
%20Chistopher%20Commision.pdf (recounting the aftermath of the trial of several Los 
Angeles police officers charged with the beating of Rodney King—a case that gained na-
tional publicity because the beating was caught on videotape; in the aftermath, Los An-
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dural rights to protect against what I term “discriminatory acquittal.”3
Courts and scholars alike ignore jury discrimination against the 
victims of crimes, despite the enormity of the problem.
  
Courts have created numerous important procedural rights to try to 
prevent discrimination against defendants, but they have not yet rec-
ognized equivalent rights to protect victims from jury discrimination.  
Prosecutors should have the tools they need to provide true “equal 
protection” of the law. 
4  Throughout 
our history, juries have purposely freed those who lynched, raped, 
and committed other hate crimes, sending a message of the permis-
sibility of such violence.5  Rape conviction rates and death penalty 
rates correlate heavily with the race of the victim.6  Juries are signifi-
cantly less likely to punish violence against black people in the same 
way as they punish violence against whites.7
 
geles erupted into riots following the acquittal, causing 53 deaths, 2383 injuries, more 
than 7000 fires, damages to 3100 businesses, and nearly $1 billion in financial losses). 
  In the context of gender, 
juries often put a victim of rape and domestic violence on trial based 
 3 Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 80–81 (2009). 
 4 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:  Do We Reliably Acquit the 
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1325 n.25 (1997) (asserting that no legal literature 
exists dealing with acquittals); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1715, 1715–17 (2006) (noting that scholars rarely address underenforcement of the law). 
 5 See infra Part I.  Discriminatory acquittal constitutes an important subset of the general 
problem of discriminatory underenforcement of the law, a problem which has received 
more scholarly attention.  See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29–135 
(1997) [hereinafter KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW] (describing the destructive ef-
fects of racially selective underprotection of the law); see also Randall Kennedy, The State, 
Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination:  A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1267 n.55 
(1994) (quoting LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES:  THE STORY OF THE ORIGIN AND 
MEANING OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1927) (“[T]he 
most extensive and frequent losses of liberty are not due either to court or executive, but 
to the failure of the force of the government to protect men from violence and mobs.  
The history of liberty could almost be written in terms of mobs that got away with it, and 
were never punished—from the Tory-hunters of 1778 to the Ku Klux Klan of 1927.”)); 
Natapoff, supra note 4 at 1717; William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing 42–43 (Harvard Pub. 
Law, Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170. 
 6 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987) (finding that juries’ death penalty 
verdicts correlate highly to the race of the victim); see also Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a 
Badge of Slavery:  The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging 
Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 36–38, 41 (2006) (arguing that while the differences in the rates 
of reported rapes are statistically insignificant between black and white rape and sexual 
assault victims, the rate of dismissals  and rejections in rape cases involving black victims 
was nearly 30% higher than those involving white victims); Tetlow, supra note 3, at 89–90 
(“Before 1977, . . . jury verdicts demonstrated an extraordinary rate of disparate sentenc-
ing [in rape cases] according to the race of both the victim and the defendant . . . . Mod-
ern statistics also show a marked disparity in conviction rates according to the race of the 
rape victim.”). 
 7 See id. 
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on whether she behaved as a “proper” woman, rather than focusing 
on the culpability of the defendant.8
We invest prosecutors with the ethical role of “doing justice” but 
do not consider whether they have any constitutional tools to help 
them do so.
  As a result of this endemic prob-
lem, prosecutors have a crucial obligation to fight for true equal pro-
tection of the law. 
9
As a start, prosecutors should share in the equal protection rights 
given to defendants during jury selection.  In Georgia v. McCollum, the 
Supreme Court granted prosecutors one of these rights; the Court 
held that the Batson v. Kentucky rule banning the racial use of pe-
remptory challenges should also govern defense counsel.
  The trial procedures used to prevent discrimination 
against defendants should also be available for prosecutors to prevent 
discrimination against victims.  At the moment, however, the prose-
cutor picking a jury in a hate crime or domestic violence trial has no 
constitutional language to describe the risk of juror discrimination 
against the alleged victim. 
10  While 
McCollum failed to ground its reasoning on the rights of the black vic-
tims in that hate crime case, it did provide support for the role of 
prosecutors in protecting the fairness of the entire system.11
One of the most important and overlooked equal protection 
rights during jury selection, and the one that I focus on here, is the 
right to voir dire jurors about their potential prejudices.  Voir dire is 
no panacea, but it is one of the only tools available to root out jury 
discrimination.
  The 
Court should go further, acknowledge the real scope of the equal 
protection rights at stake, and extend the remaining protections 
against jury discrimination to prosecutors. 
12
 
 8 See id.; Tetlow, supra note 3, at 76–77, 93–94. 
  Skillful use of voir dire can give lawyers important 
 9 Instead we ground prosecutors’ procedural rights in vague and discretionary notions of 
fair play in an adversarial system.  See infra Part III. 
 10 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (relying upon Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986)).  In McCollum, the Court, relying upon Batson, the Sixth Amendment, and the 
Georgia Constitution, concluded that, if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of ra-
cial discrimination by the defendant in jury challenges, the defendant must present a ra-
cially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges.  Id. 
 11 Id. at 55–59.  In McCollum, white defendants charged with a hate crime attempted to use 
peremptory challenges on every black potential juror.  Id. at 45.  The Court held that the 
Batson rule should apply to defense counsel, banning the racial use of peremptory chal-
lenges by either party.  Id. at 48–50.  McCollum provides some support for the constitu-
tional rights of prosecutors, but it is a missed opportunity to recognize discriminatory ac-
quittal.  Instead, the Court relied on the prosecutors’ third-party standing to protect the 
public’s perception of race-neutral justice and the rights of potential jurors against being 
stereotyped.  Id. at 55–56. 
 12 See infra Part III. 
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information about potential jurors’ degrees of empathy for minorities 
or antipathy towards women, and about jurors’ positions on hate 
crimes and rape.13  Currently, only the defendant can lay claim to a 
constitutional right to voir dire about racial bias and only in overly 
limited circumstances.14
Part I of the Article defines categories of “discriminatory acquit-
tals” and summarizes the historical and empirical evidence of the size 
of the problem.
 
15  Part II addresses third-party standing for prosecu-
tors to raise the equal protection rights of victims and explains why it 
is appropriate to task prosecutors with representing the collective 
equal protection rights of victims.16  No one else can properly fill this 
role.  While civil law systems give victims direct participation in trials, 
our Constitution creates an adversarial system that does not comport 
with third-party involvement, no matter how invested the third party 
is in the outcome.17  Part III describes the importance of voir dire to 
protect against discriminatory juries, and argues that a defendant’s 
right to voir dire about juror prejudice should also apply to prosecu-
tors and that the right should be expanded for both.18
I.  DISCRIMINATORY ACQUITTAL IS A PERVASIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION 
 
Discriminatory acquittals violate the Equal Protection Clause for 
the same reasons that discriminatory convictions do.19  Jury verdicts 
constitute state action bound by the Constitution and must not be 
motivated by race or gender discrimination.20  The Supreme Court 
has been adamant in its proclamations that discrimination should 
have no place in a criminal trial, and in its McCleskey v. Kemp decision, 
did not question the idea that jury discrimination based on the race 
of victims would violate the Equal Protection Clause.21
 
 13 Id. 
 
 14 See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976) (holding that “[t]he mere fact that the vic-
tim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were [black]” did not war-
rant a need to question potential jurors specifically about racial prejudice). 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 See infra Part II.A. 
 17 See infra Part II.B. 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 103–05 (arguing that discriminatory acquittals violate the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 20 Id. at 105–07; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1611, 1682 (1985). 
 21 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).  McCleskey involved the awkward procedural 
posture of a defendant arguing that he was less likely to have received the death penalty 
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Prosecutors encounter two broad types of discriminatory acquittal 
by juries, which I briefly describe below:  (1) acquittals motivated by 
condoning racial or gender violence, particularly when the violence 
seems to punish the victim for failure to obey racial22 or gender 
rules;23 or (2) a general lack of empathy for minority victims.24
We have a long history of juries acquitting in order to affirmatively 
condone racial violence.
 
25  Well into the twentieth century, defen-
dants could lynch, assassinate, and commit hate crimes with impuni-
ty.26  In the rare cases in which police made an arrest and prosecutors 
brought charges, all-white juries remained the ultimate protector of 
private racial violence.27
 
had he killed a minority victim, but nevertheless, the Court accepted at face value the via-
bility of those claims based on jury discrimination against the race of the victim.  Id. at 
291–92, 308–09. 
  Their verdicts sent clear signals about the 
 22 The protection of black victims from private violence shielded by all-white juries moti-
vated the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.  See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging 
the Challenge:  Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38 (1990) (describing an instance in which Congressman 
William Kelley read into the congressional record an 1864 New Orleans newspaper edi-
torial criticizing an all-white jury’s acquittal of a man who admitted to killing a black 
man). 
 23 Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”:  Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and 
Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1081–83 (2001) (describing the ways in which 
proponents of the Violence Against Women Act’s civil rights remedies made comparisons 
between racially-motivated crimes and the underenforcement of gender-based violence). 
 24 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 81–82; see also Colbert, supra note 22, at 112 (citing Marina 
Miller & Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial Similarity, 
105 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 159–60 (1978)) (describing a study showing that 80% of black 
jurors voted to convict a black defendant of raping a black woman, versus 32% of white 
jurors). 
 25 What was deemed criminal assault or homicide, if committed by a white person against a 
white person, became acceptable and effectively decriminalized when the victim was 
black.  Colbert, supra note 22, at 18–22, 28, 40–42.  The murder of a slave by a white per-
son was not considered a crime and slaves were denied access to courts and prevented 
from testifying against white people.  Id. at 18–19.  In the unusual event that a northern 
colony recognized the crime of raping a black woman, the legislature provided special de 
jure protection for the white offender; immediately following the Civil War, violence 
against black victims often went unpunished since local law enforcement refused to pros-
ecute white offenders.  Id. at 28, 40.  In Texas, whites were indicted and charged with 500 
murders of blacks between 1865 and 1866, but all-white juries acquitted every one of the 
defendants).  Id. at 41. 
 26 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 82–84 (describing the reign of terror after Emancipation, 
marked with private violence used to enforce the racial order, lynchings, and the assassi-
nation of civil rights workers); see also Colbert, supra note 22, at 87 (showing that between 
1955 and 1965, white southerners were charged with fifty-eight civil rights killings, but on-
ly six were convicted and fewer received prison sentences). 
 27 See, e.g., John Herbers, Beckwith’s 2d Trial Ends in Hung Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1964, at 1 
(reporting how, in two trials, all-white juries refused to convict Byron De La Beckwith for 
the murder of Medgar W. Evers, an NAACP official). 
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permissibility of racial violence, particularly violence meant to en-
force the racial order.28  Acquittals proved to be far more public sig-
nals than the refusal of the police and prosecutor to act.29
We still see suspicious acquittals in hate crime prosecutions,
 
30 but 
the more common modern example of discriminatory acquittal is the 
continuing acceptance of sexual violence against black women.31  
Empirical evidence shows that the race of a victim matters enormous-
ly to the conviction rates for rape.32
It is also far easier for defendants to claim self-defense for violence 
against a black victim than a white victim.  Jurors tend to project ra-
cial stereotypes of aggression and hostility onto black victims in ways 
that make it easier for defendants to claim that alleged victims were 
actually the initial aggressors.
 
33  From the acquittals of Bernard Goetz 
to the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officers who beat 
Rodney King,34 the public perception of jury discrimination against 
black victims has led to great public controversy, and even to riots.35
 
 28 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 84 (“Even more than the silent inaction of police and prosecu-
tors, such jury verdicts made dramatic statements about the permissibility of racially-
motivated violence.”). 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 84–85 (citing the infamous Rodney King incident as a modern-day hate crime pros-
ecution). 
 31 Id. at 88–90 (describing the history of legalized rapes of black women during slavery and 
the refusal to enforce rape laws against black women thereafter); see also Colbert, supra 
note 22, at 18, 28. 
 32 Tetlow, supra note 3, at 90 (“Modern statistics also show a marked disparity in conviction 
rates according to the race of the rape victim.”). 
 33 See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 
56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 8 (1989) (providing an empirical discussion of the 
implications of stereotypes and prejudice). 
 34 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 
428 (1988) (describing the acquittal of Bernard Goetz for the shooting of four young 
black men on a subway, based on his unsupported claim of self-defense); Jesse McKinley, 
Officer Guilty in Killing that Inflamed Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A11 (recounting a 
conviction of a transit officer for involuntary manslaughter, as opposed to second-degree 
murder, after contending that the shooting of the unarmed victim, Oscar Grant, was an 
accident prompted by his confusion of his sidearm with his Taser); see REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra  note 3 (cit-
ing as the impetus for the report the acquittal of Los Angeles police officers on charges of 
beating Rodney King, a black man, despite the fact that the violence was caught on video-
tape); see also Robert D. McFadden, Verdict Bares Sharp Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2000, at A1 (outlining racial divisions following the acquittal of four white police 
officers in the shooting death of an unarmed black man); Rocco Parascandola, N.Y. Pre-
pares For Verdict in Fifty-Shot Killings, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at A21 (showing New York 
City’s preparation for uprising in anticipation of the acquittal of three police officers in 
the fifty-bullet shooting of a black man); John Seewer, Ohio Officer Acquitted of Killing Mom 
Holding Baby, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2008 (referring to protests in the wake of a white 
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Empirical evidence reveals another more subtle type of discrimi-
natory acquittal, what Randall Kennedy generally calls “racially selec-
tive empathy.”36  Studies of the death penalty show a marked discrim-
ination against black victims, far more pronounced than that against 
defendants.37  The Baldus study, presented to the Supreme Court in 
McCleskey v. Kemp, proved that juries in Georgia were 4.3 times more 
likely to impose the death penalty for the killers of white victims than 
for the killers of black victims.38  These disparities continue.39  Wheth-
er conscious or not, juries in the aggregate tend to devalue the lives 
of murdered black victims.40
In the context of gender, the conviction rate for rape and domes-
tic violence is demonstrably lower than other kinds of violent crimes 
because juries do not necessarily disapprove of such violence.
 
41  Just 
as juries have allowed violence against black people who violated the 
racial code,42 juries still famously focus on whether female victims de-
served the violence against them.  Conviction rates in rape and do-
mestic violence cases correspond to the perceived virtue of the victim 
and whether she behaved as a properly obedient woman.43
At a minimum, discriminatory acquittals indicate that violence 
against certain categories of people matter less.  At their worst, dis-
criminatory acquittals grant very public permission for violence 
against those who violate the racial order or who do not behave as 
 
 
police officer’s acquittal of misdemeanor charges of negligent homicide and negligent as-
sault after shooting a black woman while she was holding her one-year-old child). 
 35 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 84–85. 
 36 KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 384–85 (coining the term “racially 
selective empathy” and describing its possible effects on criminal punishments for drug 
offenses). 
 37 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987). 
 38 Id. at 287. 
 39 Tetlow, supra note 3, at 86–87 (describing empirical studies from the 1990s that showed 
continued racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty according to the race of 
the victim). 
 40 Empirical studies tend to focus on the death penalty, so we have to extrapolate to crimi-
nal conviction rates; but as discussed above, rape conviction rates also vary based on the 
race of the victim.  See Carter, supra note 34, at 447 (“American legal and political culture 
seems to suggest . . . that there are two varieties of people who are involved in criminal ac-
tivity, black people and victims.  So perhaps when victims happen to be black, the culture 
rationalizes the seeming contradiction by denying that there has been a crime.”). 
 41 Tetlow, supra note 3, at 90–94. 
 42 Id. at 76–77 (describing lynchings for violations of the racial order, specifically the exam-
ple of Emmett Till, killed after whistling at a white woman). 
 43 Id. at 93–94 (asserting that rape trials focus less on the defendant’s intent to rape than on 
whether the victim somehow deserved the assault because of her lack of virtue or unwil-
lingness to fight to the death, just as domestic violence trials often focus on whether the 
victim provoked the abuse by nagging or cheating). 
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proper women.44  Women and minorities understand that breaking 
certain rules means that they can be beaten or raped with impunity.45
II.  VESTING THE PROSECUTOR WITH THE DUTY TO DEFEND AGAINST 
JURY DISCRIMINATION 
  
Given the importance and the scope of the problem, we should grant 
prosecutors the constitutional procedures to prevent jury discrimina-
tion against victims. 
At the moment, prosecutors have few rights rooted in the Consti-
tution, which correctly prioritizes the rights of defendants against the 
State.46  The prosecutorial rights I propose are grounded in the Su-
preme Court’s clear mandate that race and gender discrimination 
have no place anywhere in a jury trial, and that we should give prose-
cutors the tools to help combat such discrimination.47  As McCleskey v. 
Kemp itself made clear, discrimination by juries against either defen-
dants or victims violates the Equal Protection Clause.48
We should recognize a role for prosecutors to battle the endemic 




 44 Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1759–60, 1772 (asserting that underenforcement of the law ex-
poses residents to crime and insecurity, as well as reinforcing the idea that the state has 
abandoned them). 
  Particularly when 
prosecutors participate in jury selection, they should be able to arti-
culate the constitutional import of their efforts to root out discrimi-
 45 KENNEDY, CRIME, RACE, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 29–75 (arguing that discriminatory 
underenforcement of the law and the private violence it permits do more to restrict the 
liberty of women and minorities than does direct discrimination by the state). 
 46 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (holding that a state has a right to pro-
tect the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process).  Prosecutors also have the right 
to enormous discretion in charging decisions based on an argument for the separation of 
powers.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing the great 
deference that is given to prosecutorial discretion). 
 47 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (“Racial bias mars the in-
tegrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government from be-
coming a reality.”) (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979); Smith v. Texas, 311 
U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). 
 48 481 U.S. 279, 349–58 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  For a more in-depth considera-
tion of why discriminatory acquittal violates the Constitution, see Tetlow, supra note 3, at 
103–16. 
 49 See generally Tetlow, supra note 3.  Such procedures should be granted to prosecutors.  
One possibility is to prohibit defense lawyers from urging the jury to violate the Constitu-
tion by discriminating against the victim’s race or gender.  Id. at 127–28.  In addition to 
the existing evidentiary problems with such prejudicial arguments, appeals to discrimina-
tion invite constitutional error.  Id. at 128.  Prosecutors should also have a right to use 
broad voir dire and peremptory challenges to root out bias against victims.  Id. at 126–27.  
This Article fleshes out the most important category of these procedures—that involving 
jury selection. 
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nation.  As yet, the Supreme Court has never granted third-party 
standing to protect the equal protection rights of victims.50  The 
Court instead has granted prosecutors a much more tepid role to 
represent the interest in the “public perception of fairness.”51
We must ask the question of whether prosecutors can ethically, 
pragmatically, and constitutionally fulfill the role that I propose.  
Doing battle against discriminatory acquittal falls squarely within a 
prosecutor’s ethical duty to “do justice”
 
52
It is also worth asking whether such a role might better be fulfilled 
by others.  We might assign the obligation to root out jury discrimina-
tion entirely to trial judges, for example, though judges have less in-
centive to conduct the thorough voir dire that I propose.  More intri-
guing, the Supreme Court recently came perilously close to deciding 
the constitutionality of private prosecutions by victims themselves, 
who might do better to root out jury discrimination aimed at them.
 and should easily meet 
third-party standing requirements.  I also firmly believe that prosecu-
tors will choose to exercise their newfound rights for the very same 
self-interested reason that lawyers like to win cases once they go to 
trial. 
53
Ultimately, prosecutors are the best situated in our adversarial sys-
tem to protect against discriminatory acquittal.  As they choose juries 
and conduct trials, prosecutors have the ethical obligation to do jus-
tice and the pragmatic desire to win convictions.  They need not 
represent victims individually in order to protect against collective 
discrimination against women and minorities as such. 
  
Unfortunately, the direct participation of victims, common in our his-
tory and still common in civil law systems, seems too onerous a task to 
impose on victims and too disruptive to the rights of defendants in 
our adversarial system. 
 
 50 For a broader discussion of why victims have such equal protection rights, see Tetlow, su-
pra note 3, at 122–28. 
 51 As I describe below, in McCollum, the Court allowed prosecutors to complain about the 
racial use of peremptory challenges by the defendant and stretched state action doctrine 
to apply the Equal Protection Clause to defense attorneys.  505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992).  But, 
McCollum missed the opportunity to rely on the rights of victims, an argument prosecu-
tors never made to the Court in that hate crime trial. 
 52 See infra note 78. 
 53 Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010). 
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A. Prosecutors Can Exercise Third-Party Standing on Behalf of the Collective 
Right of Victims to Equal Protection of the Law 
In the context of jury selection, the Supreme Court has proved ex-
tremely willing to grant both prosecutors and defense lawyers broad 
third-party standing to protect criminal trials from equal protection 
violations.54  In the Batson line of cases, the Court allows both sides to 
raise the equal protection rights of potential jurors against the use of 
peremptory challenges based on race55 or gender.56  Both sides can 
also act to protect the public’s interest in the perception of fairness.57
Yet the Court has never recognized the prosecutor’s role in pro-
tecting against discriminatory acquittal, despite being offered the 
perfect opportunity to do so in Georgia v. McCollum.
 
58  McCollum was 
a white defendant charged with a racially-motivated crime against 
black victims, who then sought to exercise all of his peremptory 
strikes against black jurors.59  The Court granted prosecutors’ interlo-
cutory appeal, and held that the Batson rule should apply to defen-
dants and forbid the racial use of peremptory challenges by defense 
attorneys.60  Notably, neither party raised the interests of the alleged 
black victims against the striking of black jurors.61
 
 54 The Court has even granted third-party standing for defendants to complain about exclu-
sion of potential jurors of a different race.  See generally Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411–
15 (1991) (holding that the defendant had standing to assert the equal protection rights 
of a juror because he was able to show:  that he had suffered an injury in fact because of 
his sufficient interest in having neutral jury selection processes, that he had a close rela-
tion to the third-party (excluded juror) in their common interest to eliminate racial dis-
crimination, and that it is nearly impractical for a juror to bring suit himself). 
 
 55 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (holding that “a defendant may make 
a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by re-
lying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.”); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 
(holding that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in pur-
poseful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges”). 
 56 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (“Discrimination in jury 
selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the commu-
nity, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the 
judicial process.”). 
 57 See id. (“Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the 
judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the 
‘deck has been stacked’ in favor of one side.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (“Selection proce-
dures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence 
in the fairness of our system of justice.”); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) 
(noting that “a State suffers a similar injury when the fairness and integrity of its own 
judicial process is undermined”). 
 58 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56. 
 59 Id. at 45. 
 60 Id. at 59. 
 61 See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1990) (No. 91-372), 1990 WL 
512752; Respondents’ Brief on the Merits, McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (No. 91-372), 
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The Court did not focus on a prosecutor’s standing to fight for 
meaningful, race-neutral justice for the black victims of the charged 
hate crime, but ironically granted prosecutors standing to protect the 
appearance of race-neutral justice.62  Ruling in the wake of the two-
month old Rodney King acquittal and the resulting conflagration in 
Los Angeles, the Court cited the prevention of riots as a reason to 
preserve public confidence.63  “In such cases, emotions in the affected 
community will inevitably be heated and volatile.  Public confidence 
in the integrity of the criminal judicial system is essential for preserv-
ing community peace in trials involving race-related crimes.”64
While the Supreme Court missed an opportunity in McCollum to 
stake a claim against racial bias against victims, the case does provide 
support for the government’s standing to protect the fairness and in-
tegrity of its own judicial process.
  The 
actual injustice motivating the rioters did not merit a mention. 
65  Whether the prevention of dis-
criminatory acquittal constitutes a community-wide good or the pro-
tection of individual victims, it represents an important step in the 
Court’s desire for a justice system free of race and gender prejudice.  
The ruling in McCollum would have been much more convincing, 
however, had it recognized the real issues at stake.66
 
1993 WL 449264; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (No. 91-
372), 1992 WL 541450. 
  In order for 
prosecutors to assert third-party standing to protect victims against 
unlawful discrimination, they must demonstrate:  (1) serious ob-
stacles preventing the victims from asserting their own rights; (2) in-
jury-in-fact to the victim seeking third-party standing; and (3) a suffi-
 62 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59. 
 63 Id. at 49. 
 64 Id. (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:  Voir Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 195–96 (1989)) (using evi-
dence of rioting following two Miami trials in which black jurors were peremptorily struck 
by white defendants accused of a racial beating to demonstrate of the necessity of “public 
confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system” in order to maintain the peace 
in racially charged trials). 
 65 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56. 
 66 The dissenters lambasted the majority for trumping the rights of criminal defendants to 
use peremptory challenges as they choose, with the seemingly less important right of the 
public to confidence in the system and rights of jurors against unstated race conscious-
ness.  Id. at 68–69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  The majority did not assert the rights of 
black people to serve on juries, which poses interesting questions of the nature of jury 
service as governance, but instead claimed that jurors are injured by the racial stereotyp-
ing of peremptory challenges.  Id. at 48–50. 
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cient nexus between the interest of the litigant and the victim to as-
sure vigorous advocacy of the victim’s rights.67
Because our bilateral criminal justice system all but excludes vic-
tims from the criminal justice process, the first requirement of “se-
rious obstacles” is easily met.
 
68  Victims cannot assert their own rights 
to an impartial jury.  The only procedural rights afforded to victims, 
by federal and state statutes and by some state constitutions, are 
rights to be present during proceedings and to speak at bond hear-
ings and sentencings.69  None of these rights is self-executing.70  Vic-
tims clearly have no rights to participate in voir dire or jury selec-
tion.71
The second requirement of injury-in-fact could prove slightly 
more difficult.  Current doctrine does not recognize the injury suf-
fered by victims when a guilty attacker is set free.  Courts do not even 
recognize that victims suffer injury when a convicted defendant fails 
to pay restitution, holding instead that it is society as a whole that is 




In the equal protection context, however, the Court proves quite 
willing to recognize injury when participants in the criminal justice 
 
 
 67 See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection:  Whose Right Is It, 
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 756 (1992) (applying third-party standing as it pertains 
to jurors). 
 68 See Anne M. Morgan, Criminal Law—Victims Rights:  Remembering the “Forgotten Per-
son” in the Criminal Justice System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 572, 572 (1987) (citing Marlene A. 
Young, Victims of Crime:  The Great American Scandal, JUDGES’ J., Spring 1984, at 8; Lois 
Haight Herrington, Victims of Crime:  What the Government Can Do, JUDGES’ J., Spring 
1984, at 17) (indicating that the devaluation of the victim’s role in the criminal justice 
process has been coined the “Great American Scandal”). 
 69 See generally Walker A. Matthews, III, Note, Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment:  Ethical Con-
siderations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735 (1998) (describing vari-
ous state and federal approaches to the expansion of victims’ rights). 
 70 Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights:  The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neu-
trality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2005); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 331, 337 (1999) (“If additional litigants, such as victims, have a stake in this 
process . . . they must rely on the prosecutor to represent adequately their interests for 
them.”).  As an example, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of victim impact 
statements at sentencing as relevant information to the court and of healing power to the 
victim.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821–25 (1991).  Yet, victims have no right to 
make such a statement if the prosecutor chooses not to present the testimony.  Bandes, 
supra, at 341. 
 71 Bandes, supra note 70, at 337 (“The adversary system, in a criminal case, assumes only two 
parties:  the government and the defendant.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (providing that pe-
remptory challenges are available only to the defendant and to the government); see cases 
cited supra note 74. 
 72 Bandes, supra note 70, at 339 (“The punishment for the justly convicted inures to the 
good of the polity.”). 
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system suffer racial and gender discrimination, even in the absence of 
underlying substantive rights.  For example, while victims have no 
right to prosecution of their cases, victims do have the right to chal-
lenge charging decisions motivated by the race of the victim.73  No 
individual has a right to serve on a particular trial jury; yet, the Court 
has given both prosecutors and defense lawyers third-party standing 
in order to protect jurors from suffering from racial and gender ste-
reotyping.74
Increasingly, racial stereotyping itself seems to create the requisite 
injury to produce standing, even in the absence of any particularized 
harm.  In the Batson line of cases, the Court relied in part on injury to 
potential jurors allegedly arising from the prosecutor’s unspoken mo-
tives for exercising peremptory challenges.
 
75  Similarly, in Shaw v. Re-
no, the Court granted standing to voters who claimed that their con-
gressional district line might have been drawn in an awkward shape 
based on racial stereotypes about voting behavior.76
Moreover, since Georgia v. McCollum held that the perception of 
unfairness is worthy of prosecutorial standing, surely the reality of un-
fairness should also qualify.  It would be ironic if the prosecutor 
charging Los Angeles Police Department officers with beating Rod-
ney King could not act to protect King himself from injustice, but on-
ly to protect against the perception of injustice and the possibility of 
public unrest. 
  Surely a crime 
victim whose attacker is set free because the jury chooses to discrimi-
nate against the victim’s race or gender suffers a more palpable and 
serious injury. 
 
 73 Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (denying standing to citizens 
challenging the underenforcement of criminal law), with United States v. Armstrong, 517 
U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (allowing standing to respondents asserting a discriminatory effect 
of criminal prosecution). 
 74 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding defendant has stand-
ing to assert the rights of potential jurors against gender discrimination); Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) (holding prosecutors have third-party standing to as-
sert the rights of potential jurors); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (holding 
defendant has standing to assert the rights of potential jurors). 
 75 Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting when racial stereotypes are ex-
ercised as silent peremptory challenges, they avoid the overt “trafficking in the core of 
truth in most common stereotypes” that would cause offense (quoting Barbara Allen 
Babcock, Voir Dire:  Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553 (1975))).  
The Court did not rely on any right to serve on a jury, but instead relied upon the harm 
resulting from racial stereotyping.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
 76 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (holding that the given reapportionment scheme was prima 
facie irrational and could only be understood as an attempt to segregate voters into dis-
tricts on the basis of race and that such an attempt was without sufficient justification). 
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Finally, prosecutors must show a sufficient nexus between their in-
terests and the victims’ rights to assure a vigorous advocacy on their 
behalf.  This requirement is easily met because the “State’s interest in 
every trial is to see that the proceedings are carried out in a fair, im-
partial, and nondiscriminatory manner.”77  For the reasons described 
immediately below, I believe there can be no conflict between the 
prosecutor’s obligation to the defendant, to the public, and to race 
and gender-neutral justice for the victim.78
B. Preventing Discriminatory Acquittal Falls Squarely Within a Prosecutor’s 
Ethical Obligation to Do Justice 
  The rights at stake are col-
lective rather than individual, and concern the systemic reputation 
and fairness of the criminal jury system.  Equal protection rights are 
better protected through the government’s broad obligation to do 
justice. 
The ethical role of a prosecutor is not to represent victims as 
clients, nor for that matter, to represent the government itself.79  In-
stead prosecutors have the ethical duty, unique among lawyers, to do 
“justice” rather than to advocate the interests of a particular client.80  
The Supreme Court famously described the role of a prosecutor as a 
“representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a so-
vereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as 
its obligation to govern at all.”81
 
 77 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8. 
  Ethical prosecutors do not solely 
consider the interests of individual crime victims:  they are obligated 
 78 Morgan, supra note 68, at 591 (citing Nat’l Judicial Coll. Victims’ Rights Conference Par-
ticipants, Victims of Crime:  What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, JUDGES’ J., Spring 1984, at 12, 
13 (contending that victims’ rights “can be accomplished without impairing the constitu-
tional and statutory safeguards appropriately afforded all persons charged with crime”)). 
 79 See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 891 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] 
prosecutor does not ‘represent’ the victim in a criminal trial; therefore, the victim is not a 
‘client’ of the prosecutor.”); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION, & 
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.2 cmt. (1993) (“[T]he prosecutor’s client is not the victim but 
the people who live in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.”); Carol A. Corrigan, Commentary, 
On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 537 (1986) (“The prosecutor does 
not represent the victim of a crime, the police, or any individual.  Instead, the prosecutor 
represents society as a whole.”). 
 80 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1983) (“A prosecutor has the responsibili-
ty of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3) (2004) (stating that prosecutors must “seek justice”); see also 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-
1.2(c) (1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”). 
 81 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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to protect the fair functioning of the system, including, for that mat-
ter, the defendant’s rights.82
This distinction frequently matters.  Prosecutors face ethical di-
lemmas in balancing the interests of the community against the in-
terests of a particular victim, and against the collective interests of vic-
tims.
 
83  Domestic violence cases present archetypal examples of when 
those interests diverge and provide a context relevant for our consid-
eration of discriminatory acquittal.  Victims of domestic violence of-
ten ask a prosecutor to drop charges out of rational calculations for 
their own safety and survival.84  Prosecutors then must decide whether 
to honor victims’ wishes, while balancing the safety of this particular 
victim against the deterrent effect of prosecution against the defen-
dant batterer.85  More difficult still, prosecutors must balance the 
safety of a particular victim against the deterrent effect of prosecution 
on all batterers, thus trading off the safety of a particular victim 
against the safety of all future victims.86  In the course of these agoniz-
ing decisions, prosecutors frequently and explicitly elevate the inter-
ests of the community over the interests of a victim.87
I do not propose that prosecutors represent the specific interests 
of victims as they would a client, but instead that they represent the 
far more collective rights of victims to equal protection of the law.  
Fighting for the rights of victims to verdicts free from race or gender 
discrimination cannot create a conflict of interest.  Equal protection 




 82 See Matthews, supra note 69, at 741 (1998) (noting that prosecutors must consider “1) 
liberty and due process; 2) public order and safety; and 3) governmental efficiency and 
economy”). 
 
 83 See Gershman, supra note 70, at 561 (evaluating the changing role of victims in the crimi-
nal justice system). 
 84 See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence:  The Role of the Police Officer and the 
Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 298, 308–09 (1993) (describing how prosecutors are 
starting to focus on the long-term accountability for the abuser).  See generally Cheryl 
Hanna, No Right to Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (exploring a system where victims must proceed with 
charges despite their own fears and concerns). 
 85 The stakes are high.  The Los Angeles District Attorney’s office, for example, made the 
decision to honor Nicole Brown Simpson’s desires to drop domestic violence charges 
against her husband O.J. Simpson.  Hanna, supra note 84, at 1850–51. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Failure to do so can constitute an ethics violation.  See Gershman, supra note 70, at 561 
(describing the risk of ethical violations when prosecutors elevate interests of the victim 
in vengeance against the defendant’s rights, or against broader public interest in offering 
a plea bargain to reward cooperation). 
 88 See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:  The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 13, 52 (1998) (arguing that prosecutors have duties to protect the community, 
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The Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that dis-
crimination anywhere in a trial is anathema to the precepts of our tri-
al system. 
[T]he injury caused by the discrimination is made more severe because 
the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself.  Few 
places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority of the 
government than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds . . . [and 
where] juries render verdicts . . . .89
The Court also has rejected the argument that “gender discrimina-
tion . . . , unlike racial discrimination, is tolerable in the courtroom,” 
even though gender classifications receive only intermediate scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.
 
90  A just criminal justice system is 
one that does not operate based on race or gender of the partici-
pants.  As such, the obligation to prevent verdicts based on unconsti-
tutional discrimination cannot conflict with the obligation to do jus-
tice.  The Court tasks all of the participants in the criminal justice 
system with the obligation to protect against such discrimination.91
Obligation does not equate to willingness, so it is also important 
to ask the pragmatic question of whether prosecutors will care 
enough about the equal protection rights of victims to fulfill this re-
sponsibility.  Indeed, empirical studies evidence race-of-the-victim bi-
as in charging decisions made by prosecutors.
 
92  Studies also show bi-
as against charging gender-based violence depending on the 
perceived virtue of the female victim.93
 
and to “ensure that victims and defendants in the criminal justice system are treated fair-
ly, equitably and in a nondiscriminatory manner”). 
  Prosecutors too often exhibit 
internal bias or the willingness to anticipate the bias of juries, or 
both, so it might seem strange to vest them with responsibility of 
fighting discriminatory acquittal.  After all, jury discrimination is a 
mere subset of the discriminatory underenforcement of the law.  Be-
fore a case ever gets to a jury, police officers and prosecutors exercise 
great discretion about whether to make an arrest, whether to charge 
 89 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). 
 90 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994). 
 91 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1986) (“[T]he State may not draw up its jury 
lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at ‘other stages in 
the selection process . . . .’”). 
 92 See Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble:  Prosecutors and the Allocation 
of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBS. 439, 446 (1979) (finding that when a victim was white, 
prosecutors were more likely to pursue the highest available charge in a leading statistical 
study conducted to determine whether prosecutors consider race when determining 
whether to proceed with the most severe charges found). 
 93 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1130 (1986)  (describing the archaic theorem 
that a “truly unwilling woman would fight nearly to the death to protect her virtue”). 
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a defendant, and whether to allow him to plead guilty before trial.94  
Law enforcement officials prove far more likely to bring charges for 
violence against a white victim or for gender-based violence against a 
“virtuous” woman.95
But when prosecutors do bring charges in cases made difficult by 
the possibility of jury discrimination, we should give them the tools 
they need to counter it.  The prosecutors brave enough to bring the 
killers of Emmett Till and Medgar Evars to trial deserved a constitu-
tional foothold to describe the importance of their uphill battles.
 
96
Moreover, once a case goes to trial, prosecutors, like all lawyers, 
have a psychological incentive to win.
  At 
the moment, prosecutors can rely on nothing more than the trial 
judge’s sense of relative fairness and relevance. 
97  Much more than charging 
and plea-bargaining decisions, which most often occur in safe obscur-
ity, prosecutors perceive trials as a public measure of their personal 
ability.98
It also would create an important normative change to task prose-
cutors with the explicit role of protecting the equal protection rights 
  Imbuing the right to protect victims with prosecutors would 
harness the power of self-interest to help prosecutors root out jury bi-
as against victims.  Prosecutors might require better training to per-
form this obligation well, but they would have a great incentive to do 
so. 
 
 94 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 760–61 (2005) (describing the consti-
tutional necessity of police discretion); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 
(1996) (describing the importance of prosecutorial discretion as a separation of powers 
issue). 
 95 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 29–75.  See Estrich, supra note 93, at 1087–89 (sharing a story 
about how officers treated the “virtuous” author following her own rape); Pokorak, supra 
note 6, at 39–40 (highlighting the typical differences in the women raped and the jurors 
who decide their cases); Myers & Hagan, supra note 92, at 446 (describing a study show-
ing prosecutorial bias based on race of victims). 
 96 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 82–84.  Often these were federal prosecutors, who may or may 
not have come from the communities in which the murders occurred, but in the cases of 
Emmett Till and Medgar Evers, Mississippi district attorneys brought the cases to trial.  See 
ORR KLOPFER, supra note 2; ADAM NOSSITER, OF LONG MEMORY:  MISSISSIPPI AND THE 
MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS (1994).  In 1933, Professor James Chadbourn estimated that 
less than 1% of lynchings since 1900 resulted in a conviction.  JAMES HARMON 
CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAW 13–14 (1933). 
 97 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:  Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Con-
duct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 882 (1995) (describing the “desire 
to ‘win’” as a central characteristic of prosecutorial culture); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal 
Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134, 
138 (2004) (noting the emphasis district attorneys’ offices place on conviction rates). 
 98 Kenneth Bresler, Essay, “I Never Lost a Trial”:  When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convic-
tions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (criticizing prosecutors who keep personal 
tallies for self-promotion). 
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of victims.  At the moment, both police and prosecutors unabashedly 
use the specter of jury discrimination to legitimate their own antic-
ipatory discrimination.99  If juries probably will not convict for vi-
olence against certain kinds of victims, then law enforcement will ex-
pend fewer resources bringing such cases.100  The result is that 
minority communities are less protected, and women are subject to 
epidemic rates of rape and domestic violence.101
C.  Prosecutors Should Root Out Jury Discrimination Rather than Judges 
  Acknowledging dis-
criminatory acquittal, and tasking prosecutors with battling it, will 
send prosecutors a very different message about the illegitimacy of 
anticipating jury discrimination.  Granting prosecutors new proce-
dural tools of constitutional priority would go a long way to commu-
nicating the urgency of the task. 
Perhaps we could avoid any issue of granting equal protection 
rights and obligations to prosecutors by instead imbuing the obliga-
tion with the court.  Unlike other procedural trial rights, voir dire of-
ten falls within the purview of the trial judge.  Clearly the judge al-
ready has responsibility for ensuring fundamental fairness and an 
impartial jury.102
Leaving such voir dire only to judges, however, would prove con-
siderably less effective than granting it to lawyers.
  Investing the court with this power would make 
clear that the rights at stake are systemic, concerned with preserving 
the sanctity of the process.  During jury selection, for example, we 
could ask the trial judge to voir dire about discriminatory attitudes 
and act on the results with dismissal of jurors biased against either de-
fendant or victim. 
103  First, studies 
show potential jurors are more likely to lie and to give the seemingly 
correct answer to judges as authority figures.104
 
 99 See Davis, supra note 88, at 25–32, 53. 
  They do not want to 
100 Pokorak, supra note 6, at 49. 
101 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 69–75. 
102 Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:  The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed So-
lutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 157 (2010). 
103 Colbert, supra note 22, at 121 n.584 (“For jury selection to be meaningful, the defense 
attorney must conduct the voir dire.”). 
104 See Bennett, supra note 102, at 160 (describing his experience as a district court judge 
receiving answers from jurors); Susan E. Jones, Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire:  
An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1987); Linda L. 
Marshall & Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics, Evaluation Anxiety, and Expec-
tancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. PSYCHOL. 205, 214 (1986). 
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embarrass themselves by giving the wrong answer to an apparently 
moral question, often in an extremely public setting.105
More importantly, as described above, granting the responsibility 
to prosecutors harnesses the power of self-interest.  Prosecutors have 
more incentive to ask voir dire questions well, in subtle ways designed 
to illicit information relevant to peremptory challenges, rather than 
the more rhetorical questioning common to judicial voir dire.
 
106  
There is a big difference between a judge who asks jurors to raise 
their hand if they are incapable of being fair, compared to a lawyer’s 
ability to inquire, in the course of individualized questioning, how a 
juror feels about particular race or gender signifiers.107
D.  Why Not Give Victims Direct Participation? 
 
Should victims themselves be permitted to participate in trials to 
protect their own rights?  It is a question serious enough to be taken 
up by the Supreme Court recently.108  Victims and their counsel 
would likely prove more effective at directly rebutting the discrimina-
tion that leads to jury nullification.109  The direct presence of victims 
in the proceedings might combat a discriminatory lack of empathy.110  
Victims of gender-based crimes could more directly rebut attacks on 
their character for failing to meet expected gender roles.111  Allowing 
victims to participate could give voice to the voiceless, and remind ju-
ries to contemplate the rights of victims to equal protection of the 
law.112
 
105 The possibility of public embarrassment can be alleviated by the more frequent use of 
jury questionnaires rather than just public questioning.  These are no substitute for more 
individualized follow-up questions, but they do provide a different type of opportunity for 
jurors to more privately admit or hint at bias. 
 
106 Bennett, supra note 102, at 160 (noting that lawyers know their cases better, have greater 
access to jury consultants, and generally do a better job than judges at voir dire). 
107 See id. 
108 In the last decade, there have been numerous proposals to expand the procedural rights 
of victims, including a proposed victim’s rights amendment to the Constitution.  None of 
these proposals, however, suggests the kind of direct trial participation necessary to guard 
against discriminatory acquittal.  See Matthews, supra note 69. 
109 William T. Pizzi, Victims’ Rights:  Rethinking Our “Adversary System”, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 
355 (1999) (noting that in Germany, sexual assault victims take an interest in participat-
ing at trial through counsel; as character and credibility are likely to come under attack 
by the defendant, victims feel as if their stakes in the trial are high). 
110 Id. at 357 (recounting a “hotly contested” rape trial where an admitted drug addict 
claimed she had been raped by two defendants who insisted that she had agreed to have 
sex with them on the promise that they would give her heroin the following day). 
111 See id. 
112 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (stating that historically, a citi-
zen lacked standing to contest policies of prosecutors if he were neither subject to prose-
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Many civil law systems around the world permit the direct partici-
pation of victims in criminal trials.  Countries such as Germany and 
France allow victims to question witnesses and make closing argu-
ments, using their own counsel if they choose.113  Civilian judges, 
however, actively supervise the actual investigation, rather than refe-
ree an entirely bilateral battle between state and defendant.114  As 
such, judges consider a much broader array of evidence and can in-
vite participation by third parties without the same claims of preju-
dice.115
Even our own criminal justice system originally allowed the direct 
participation of victims, not as third parties, but as “private prosecu-
tors.”  Most of the American colonies initially followed the English 
tradition of allowing victims to prosecute their own cases.
 
116  States 
did not invest prosecutorial authority in a public prosecutor until the 
end of the eighteenth century, and private prosecution continued in 
many areas throughout the nineteenth century.117
 
cution nor threatened with prosecution); Bandes, supra note 70, at 347 (urging a broader 
definition of standing for victims, particularly those protecting their equal protection 
rights, but noting the “cynical conclusion” that “the only collective interest cognizable is 
the government’s own definition of its own interests, which it buttresses when necessary 
by claiming to represent victims or society as a whole”). 
  Today, a number 
113 Victims and their counsel may question witnesses and make closing arguments.  See Pizzi, 
supra note 109, at 358.  Civilian systems often allow victims and their attorneys to stand 
beside prosecutors and defense lawyers, to question witnesses and to give closing argu-
ments.  See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems:  An American on Trial for an 
American Murder in the French Cour d’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 819–22 (2001); 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17–18 (Christine Van Den 
Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993); R.L. Jones, Victims of Crime in France, 158 JUST. PEACE & LOC. 
GOV’T L. 795, 795–96 (1994); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure:  The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law 
Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (1992) (stating that in Italy, injured persons are en-
titled to participate as parties to criminal cases from pretrial to appeal).  In Germany, vic-
tim participation is allowed in cases very personal to victims or their families.  William T. 
Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms:  A Comparative Perspective on 
American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 54–55 (1996). 
114 Pizzi & Perron, supra note 113, at 54–55; Bandes, supra note 70, at 337 (noting that a di-
rect role for victims could not “be so easily grafted onto our system as currently struc-
tured”).  Inquisitorial systems are far more directed towards truth-telling, using judges in 
an investigative role to flesh out all of the relevant facts without strict evidentiary exclu-
sion.  This more comfortably allows victims to speak directly to the court.  Id. at 337–38. 
115 See Pizzi, supra note 109, at 358. 
116 See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 
ARK. L. REV. 511, 515–21 (1994) (discussing the historical development of prosecution); 
Matthews, supra note 69, at 736–37 (describing the American divergence from the Eng-
lish approach, allowing greater protection of defendant’s rights but at the expense of vic-
tims’ rights). 
117 Matthews, supra note 69, at 737. 
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of jurisdictions allow some form of private prosecution, usually as to 
minor crimes.118
With a few exceptions, the modern version of private prosecution 
permits victim’s counsel to participate alongside the public prosecu-
tor.
 
119  Unlike civil law systems, private prosecution envisions the vic-
tim as a replacement of sorts for the prosecutor, rather than as a 
third party representing her own interests.120  It is precisely this blur-
ring of roles that has given the Supreme Court and many scholars 
concern about the constitutionality of private prosecution.121
The fundamental differences between the ethical duties of a pros-
ecutor and of a lawyer with a private client create potential conflicts 
of interest.
 
122  The public prosecutor is vested with the obligation to 
do justice, not to seek retribution on behalf of any particular victim.123  
States have attempted to solve this problem by investing the private 
prosecutor with the same ethical obligations of the public prosecutor, 
but that simply exacerbates the conflict of interest between that at-
torney’s actual client, the victim, and a prosecutor’s obligation to do 
justice more broadly defined.124
 
118 See Bessler, supra note 116, at 529; Matthew S. Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters:  Ar-
guments Against Private Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 279, 282 (2001). 
 
119 See Pizzi, supra note 109, at 350–53. 
120 See generally Bessler, supra note 116. 
121 See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 802 (1987) (holding that civil at-
torneys were precluded from serving as private prosecution in a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding arising out of the same civil case because this dual representation created a con-
flict of interest but not concluding that private prosecution is per se unconstitutional); see 
Nichols, supra note 118, at 289–91; see also Bessler, supra note 116, at 558 (“Because pri-
vate prosecutors have financial incentives that public prosecutors do not, and because 
private prosecutors create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety, private prose-
cutors violate defendants’ due process rights.”). 
122 Many of these concerns about conflicts focus on the attorneys who represent victims both 
in private prosecutions and in civil cases in which the attorney may directly benefit.  See 
Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[U]se of private prosecutors who 
are also representing plaintiffs in civil actions against the criminal defendant should be 
discouraged . . . .”); Nichols, supra note 118, at 281.  One could ban this practice, howev-
er, and still allow victims to employ independent counsel to represent them solely in the 
criminal proceeding.  Several states have done so.  See Bessler, supra note 116, at 530. 
123 See supra Part II.B. 
124 See New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 748 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding a conflict of in-
terest for a private citizen pursuant to state rule to initiate and prosecute assault charges); 
Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1981) (expressing “concern about the 
practice of using a private attorney, paid by family and friends of the victim, to prosecute 
persons accused of murdering a person dear to the people paying the private prosecu-
tor[,]” though rejecting the argument that use of a private prosecutor requires reversal); 
see also Nichols, supra note 118, at 293–94 (discussing conflict of interest); Bessler, supra 
note 116, at 542–71 (arguing that due process forbids use of private prosecutors because 
of inherent conflicts). 
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In 2010, the Supreme Court came tantalizingly close to addressing 
the issue of a private prosecution by a domestic violence victim in the 
case of Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson.125  The Court granted 
certiorari in the case to consider whether the victim of domestic vi-
olence could prosecute the defendant for criminal contempt for vi-
olation of a civil restraining order.126  The victim proceeded over the 
objections of the federal prosecutor, who had previously worked out 
a plea bargain with the defendant to punish him for an earlier as-
sault.127  Ultimately, however, a majority of the Court decided that the 
relevant issues were not clearly presented by the facts of the case, and 
the Court denied certiorari as “improvidently granted.”128
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a twelve page dissent, joined by Justic-
es Scalia, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, urging the Court to reject private 
prosecution because “[o]ur entire criminal justice system is premised 
on the notion that a criminal prosecution pits the government 
against the governed, not one private citizen against another.  The 
ruling below [affirming the contempt conviction] is a startling repud-
iation of that basic understanding.”
 
129  Chief Justice Roberts ques-
tioned whether a victim bringing criminal contempt proceedings 
would be subject to all of the constitutional criminal procedural re-
quirements of a government prosecutor, including revealing exculpa-
tory information or administering Miranda warnings before interview-
ing the defendant.130
I do not believe that a drastic expansion of victim participation in 
all criminal trials is desirable or necessary.  As a practical matter, re-
quiring victims to enforce their own equal protection rights within 
the criminal justice system by hiring private lawyers would have li-
mited impact.
  Regardless of how the Court ultimately decides 
this issue, it is clear that our adversarial system of criminal justice 
does not comfortably allow for private prosecution, even in the con-
text of contempt proceedings of a civil order. 
131
 
125 See Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010) (dismissing writ 
of certiorari as improvidently granted in a case questioning whether an action for crimi-
nal contempt in a congressionally-created court cannot be brought in the name and pur-
suant to the power of a private person). 
  Most victims cannot and would not pursue hiring a 
126 Id. at 2185–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 2185. 
128 Id.; Justice Stephen Breyer, Lecture before the Tulane Law School Summer Program at 
Cambridge University (July 12, 2010). 
129 Robertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2188 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
130 Id. at 2187–88. 
131 See Pizzi & Perron, supra note 113, at 55 n.76 (stating that in the German civil law legal 
system, victim participation was only 19.2% in cases where victims were eligible to partici-
pate); see also Pizzi, supra note 109, at 355 (stating that German crime victims rarely wish 
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private prosecutor for the very reasons they do not pursue the civil 
tort remedies already available to them.132  Victims fail to find lawyers 
to represent them even for tort cases that come with financial reme-
dies, and also find such cases too dangerously provocative against a 
violent perpetrator.133
More importantly, requiring resources to obtain equal protection 
of the law is anathema to our criminal justice system.  We have al-
ready traveled too far down the road of private policing in wealthy 
communities, allocating the resources of law enforcement according 
to the ability to pay.
 
134  We should not start privatizing prosecution for 
those who can afford it.135
The risk of discriminatory acquittal does not occur in every case 
involving a victim, and the inclusion of individual victims in trials 
would be an unwieldy attempt to address the issue.  Instead, the pros-
ecutor is well-placed to enforce the rights of victims to race-neutral, 
or gender-neutral, justice as part of our existing system.
 
136
III.  GIVING PROSECUTORS CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES TO ROOT 
OUT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION DURING JURY SELECTION 
 
Jury selection lies at the center of the constitutional criminal pro-
cedures designed to protect defendants’ equal protection rights, ef-
forts that have always relied more on preventive procedures than on 
direct remedies.137
 
to participate in the trial, relying instead on the state’s attorneys and judges to reach a 
fair verdict and sentence). 
  Though defendants can appeal and seek reversal 
of discriminatory verdicts (unlike prosecutors), as a practical matter, 
sexism and racism on the part of jurors is almost impossible to 
132 Bessler, supra note 116, at 586–87. 
133 See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 94–95 (2000) 
(describing the danger of bringing tort suits for domestic violence injuries). 
134 See M. Rhead Enion, Note, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State’s Allocation of 
Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 519 (2009) (describing the ubiquitous use of private police forces 
and resulting constitutional concerns). 
135 See Nichols, supra note 118, at 286–87 (stating that transforming the role of the “public 
prosecutor into a pure advocate and representative of the crime victim” with privatization 
is “contrary to our entire system of criminal justice”). 
136 Indeed, the equal protection rights of victims necessarily involve a more collective form 
of justice, as in the rights of women and minorities against systematic devaluation and as 
subject to sanctioned private violence.  It has always proved awkward in antidiscrimina-
tion law to present collective equality as an individual right.  See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976). 
137 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 102–03 (stating that jury discrimination is difficult to prove 
and measure, and therefore “[c]ourts may have no choice about relying on procedure 
and prevention rather than regulating the results and the accuracy of jury delibera-
tions”). 
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prove.138  Instead, the Court created much of constitutional criminal 
procedure in order to prevent discriminatory jury convictions.139  In 
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court overtly acknowledged the cynical truth 
that “[t]here is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a 
jury’s decision in a criminal case. . . . The question is ‘at what point 
that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable.’”140  The Court threw 
its hands up at proving or curing discrimination after the fact, and in-
stead hoped to prevent jury discrimination through procedures.141
To prevent verdicts based on racial or gender discrimination, the 
Court understandably focuses on jury selection.  After a biased jury is 
chosen and seated, even the most carefully conducted trial in the 




138 McCleskey held that defendants must show discrimination in their specific jury’s delibera-
tions and cannot rely on statistical evidence of an increased likelihood of discrimination.  
481 U.S. 279, 292–97.  Modern discrimination often remains unspoken, and almost always 
remains hidden within the secrecy governing jury deliberations.  See id. at 296–97.  See gen-
erally Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment:  Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in 
Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (2005) (arguing for an amendment of jury 
secrecy rules in capital cases to prevent against prejudicial and erroneous decision mak-
ing).  Jury secrecy has been justified on several policy grounds:  (1) preserving the finality 
of verdicts from speculation about jury deliberations; (2) deference for the jury’s role as 
fact-finder, a role that would be challenged if judges could simply substitute their own 
judgments; (3) avoiding the harassment of jurors after a verdict; (4) fostering free and 
open deliberations by jurors without concern for future embarrassment; and (5) preserv-
ing public confidence in the jury, by hiding the quality of deliberations from the public.  
Id. at 806–13. 
  The Court governs jury dis-
139 See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 48 (2000); Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Crim-
inal Procedure:  From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359 
(2001).  For examples of the Court’s superficial treatment of the racial issues at stake, see, 
for example, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (referring to the defendants as 
an “indigent Mexican defendant” and an “indigent Los Angeles Negro”); Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936) (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (Miss. 1935) 
(noting the lower court’s description of the defendants as “all ignorant negroes”); Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932) (“The petitioners . . . are negroes charged with the 
crime of rape . . . of two white girls.”). 
140 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308–09 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 
36 n.8 (1986)). 
141 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (proc-
laiming a ban on the racial use of peremptory challenges)); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 
474, 511 n.8 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he jury system and the fair-cross-section 
principle were designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sentence 
based on race of the victim.”). 
142 For example, in the Scottsboro boys cases, the Supreme Court twice reversed the convic-
tions of nine African American boys falsely accused of raping two white women on a train, 
eight of whom were sentenced to death.  The Court continued to create new procedures 
designed to limit the impact of jury discrimination, yet Alabama juries continued to con-
vict the defendants after each remand.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 56 (1932) 
(finding that defendants received inadequate counsel when every lawyer in the county 
  
1142 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
crimination in multiple ways:  it bans the exclusion of minorities and 
women from the jury pool;143 it gives defendants the right to voir dire 
potential jurors about potential discrimination;144 and it bans the ra-
cial or gendered use of peremptory challenges by lawyers during jury 
selection.145  In interesting and sometimes contradictory ways, the 
Court strives for jury diversity, governs juror impartiality, and regu-
lates the motives of lawyers picking juries.146
While the Court has never granted prosecutors the right to ferret 




was jointly appointed to represent them); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935) 
(reversing a defendant’s conviction because all blacks were excluded from the jury).  See 
generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO:  A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979) (pre-
senting another instance in which biased jurors continued to convict the defendants). 
 Georgia v. McCollum did 
143 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310, 312 (1880) (banning exclusion of blacks 
from jury venire); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (banning exclusion of wom-
en). 
144 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594, 598 (1976) (holding that “the demands of due process 
could be satisfied by [the defendant’s] more generalized but thorough inquiry into the 
impartiality of the veniremen”). 
145 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (affirming the principle that a “State’s 
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in 
the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that “a crimi-
nal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory 
challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race”); 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that “the Constitution prohibits a 
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in 
the exercise of peremptory challenges”). 
146 As I argue in a forthcoming article, the Supreme Court has three constitutional proce-
dural mechanisms to serve the Sixth Amendment purposes of an “impartial jury” as in-
formed by the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of a jury unbiased by race or gender.  
See Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point, 97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  First, 
the Court focuses on rooting out individual bias in jurors through voir dire and the use of 
challenges.  Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595 (explaining that judge-directed voir dire is part of 
“the State’s obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury”).  Second, the 
Court uses diversity as a proxy for impartiality, for example, guaranteeing a jury pool cho-
sen from a “fair cross section of the community.”  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526–27.  Finally, and 
most confusingly, the Batson rule regulates discrimination against potential jurors.  Batson, 
476 U.S. 89.  Despite the fact that courts and scholars focus most obsessively on this last 
principle, it proves the least connected to the goal of an impartial and nondiscriminatory 
jury.  See Tetlow, supra. 
147 The Court’s Sixth Amendment protections against banning women and minorities from 
the jury pool have the effect of protecting both victims and defendants.  Though the right 
to challenge exclusions from the jury pool belongs to the defendant and not the prosecu-
tor, such challenges have long since resulted in an inclusive pool that benefits both sides.  
See Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury 
Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 378–79 (2010) (“[P]eremptory challenges are bene-
ficial when used properly—that is, when based on factors that legitimately may affect or 
indicate a juror’s view of the evidence or willingness to vote for one side or the other—
because they help ensure an impartial jury, a right protected by the Sixth Amendment.”). 
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create one procedural right that unintentionally protects against dis-
criminatory acquittal.  It gave prosecutors the constitutional right to 
object to the racial use of peremptory challenges by defense law-
yers.148  As described above, this provides a starting point and some 
precedent for the rights I urge.  Yet the case proves less useful than it 
should because the Court chose shakier foundations than the battle 
against discriminatory acquittal.  The Court worried more about the 
public’s confidence in the appearance of equality rather than the vic-
tim’s substantial interest in its reality.149
Beyond peremptory challenges, I focus on more uncharted terri-
tory in the jury selection process.  The right to ask potential jurors 
questions during voir dire about bias remains one of the most impor-
tant, and often overlooked, protections against jury discrimination.
 
150  
The Supreme Court frequently acknowledges the importance of voir 
dire, yet strangely limits the constitutional right to inquire into bias, 
instead leaving the scope of voir dire almost entirely to the discretion 
of trial judges.151
A. Applying the Defendant’s Voir Dire Rights to Prosecutors to Protect Against 
Discriminatory Acquittal 
  I argue that the Court should strengthen the right 
to voir dire about bias, and apply it to protect against any verdict that 
rests on illegal discrimination, whether conviction or acquittal. 
The process of voir dire, conducted before the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges, is an enormously valuable and overlooked 
source of jury regulation.152
 
148 See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 (holding that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defen-
dant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges”). 
  It is a source of profitable business for 
jury consultants and obsession by trial lawyers, but because it falls 
largely within the discretion of trial judges, it is the subject of few ap-
149 Id. at 49 (stating that “[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude African Ameri-
cans from juries undermine [the] public confidence” and that “[t]he need for public 
confidence is especially high in cases involving race-related crimes”). 
150 See Richard J. Crawford & Daniel W. Patterson, Exploring and Expanding Voir Dire Bounda-
ries:  A Note to Judges and Trial Lawyers, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 662 (1997) (stating 
that “[o]pening up the questioning process is likely to enhance the quality of juror 
screening without doing violence to the fair trial ideal”); see generally Barbara Allen Bab-
cock, supra note 75, at 549 (describing the importance of voir dire in rooting out poten-
tial discrimination). 
151 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994) (recognizing the im-
portance of voir dire); see also discussion of the limits on that right infra Parts III.A.1-2. 
152 See Babcock, supra note 75, at 546; see also Crawford & Patterson, supra note 150, at 662. 
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peals.153  In the abstract, voir dire simply proves less interesting to 
scholars than to lawyers who actually choose juries.154  Yet, I argue that 
the breadth of voir dire on the subject of bias can do far more to im-
prove the impartiality of the jury than any Batson challenge.155
1.  Voir Dire on the Subject of Bias 
 
Jury selection procedures strive for an impartial jury through a se-
lection process designed to avoid the most biased extremes on either 
side.156  First, the voir dire process collects information about individ-
ual jurors.157  The judge then focuses on removing the most clearly 
biased jurors “for cause.”158  We then harness the self-interest of the 
parties and ask each side to use dueling peremptory strikes.159  After 
this process of inquiry and winnowing, the first twelve are seated as 
the trial jury.160
 
153 See State v. Allred, 169 S.E.2d 833, 838 (N.C. 1969) (holding that a party is not allowed 
appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause unless the 
party:  (1) uses a peremptory challenge to strike the juror in question; (2) exhausts the 
peremptory challenges allowed by statute; and (3) asserts its right to challenge perempto-
rily an additional juror). 
 
154 But see John C. Reinard & Darin J. Arsenault, The Impact of Forms of Strategic and Non-
Strategic Voir Dire Questions on Jury Verdicts, 67 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 158, 158 (2000) (stat-
ing that “[s]cholars have dedicated time to isolate functions of voir dire questions”). 
155 See Barat S. McClain, Note, Turner’s Acceptance of Limited Voir Dire Renders Batson’s Equal 
Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 273, 274–75, 306 (1989) (presenting the 
idea that voir dire can be important to eliminating jury discrimination without violating 
the essence of Batson’s prohibition on presuming such prejudice according to race); see 
also Kimberly Wise, Comment, Peering Into the Judicial Magic Eight Ball:  Arbitrary Decisions in 
the Area of Juror Removal, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 813, 815–17 (2009) (explaining that voir 
dire is used to accomplish the “seemingly insurmountable task of providing an impartial 
jury” and that “[t]he main purpose of voir dire is to ensure that the selected jury is impar-
tial, meaning that it is unbiased and without prejudice”). 
156 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
91 (1986)) (“Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it be-
lieves will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of ‘eliminat[ing] extremes of 
partiality on both sides,’ thereby ‘assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased 
jury.’”). 
157 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (permitting attorneys to examine prospective jurors). 
158 See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (holding that the appropriate standard 
for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause is “whether the ju-
ror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror 
in accordance with his instructions and his oath,’” which “does not require that a juror’s 
bias be proved with unmistakable clarity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
159 See Ford, supra note 147, at 377 (“Attorneys try to shape jury selection by exercising pe-
remptory [strikes].”). 
160 See V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION:  AN ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO JURY 
LAW AND METHODS, 352 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the benefits of judge-conducted voir 
dire and the disadvantages of attorney-conducted voir dire).  The Constitution also allows 
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The process of questioning potential jurors about their back-
grounds and beliefs occurs within the parameters set out by individu-
al judges, and within the rules and traditions of their respective 
courts.161  The leeway that judges give to lawyers to suggest voir dire 
questions, or to ask the questions directly themselves, varies wildly.162  
In many federal courts, judges limit voir dire to information about a 
juror’s occupation, place of residence, potential conflicts of interest, 
and whether the juror or their immediate family has been arrested or 
has been a crime victim.163  The judge then asks rhetorical questions 
about the willingness to obey instructions and to be impartial.164  
Meanwhile, in many state courts and in some federal courts, lawyers 
conduct their own voir dire with great flexibility and use a seemingly 
limitless array of personal questions.165
 
juries of less than twelve.  See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (allowing a jury 
of six). 
  Judges determine the breadth 
of voir dire by balancing judicial efficiency against fairness to the liti-
161 Before a jury is selected, the trial judge conducts voir dire, questioning potential jurors 
about their qualifications and backgrounds.  Many judges question jurors themselves, 
though frequently they allow prosecutors and defense lawyers to do so directly.  Judges 
vary widely by jurisdiction and discretion in the leeway they give attorneys in voir dire.  See 
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (“Voir dire is conducted under the supervision 
of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
162 See Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”:  “Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV 523, 525–26 (1998) (describing a judge who was from the “Any-Twelve-
in-the-Box-Will-Do” school of jury selection and would not allow attorneys to conduct voir 
dire). 
163 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice, & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 674–75 
(2002) (arguing that using only basic and limited questions in a “cursory process at best” 
is likely due to judicial desire for efficiency, but has the negative consequence that very 
little information is provided in order to root out biased jurors and provide as close to an 
impartial jury as possible).  In other cases, judges (and lawyers) probe deeper into private 
attitudes and practices.  For example, they sometimes ask about religious beliefs, drinking 
habits, jobs, hobbies, etc.  See Alschuler, supra note 64, at 158. 
164 See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 451 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no 
single way to voir dire a juror. . . . [A trial] judge can also evaluate impartiality by explain-
ing the trial processes and asking general questions about the juror’s commitment to fol-
low the law and the trial court’s instructions.”). 
165 See Bennett, supra note 102, at 159 (stating that federal courts generally allow less lawyer 
involvement); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (stating that the court may examine prospec-
tive jurors or permit attorneys to do so); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594 (quoting Connors v. 
United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895)) (“Voir dire ‘is conducted under the supervision 
of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.’”); Anne 
M. Payne & Christine Cohoe, Jury Selection and Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 76 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS 127, 143 (2000) (stating that “[m]ost states give trial counsel broad discretion in 
questioning prospective jurors”). 
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gants.166  There is no per se right for lawyers to have jurors questioned 
about their biases.167
The most direct approach to rooting out bias during voir dire 
would simply allow lawyers to question potential jurors directly on the 
issue of prejudice in an effort to uncover discriminatory beliefs.
 
168  
The skillful use of voir dire might identify racial or gender bias 
against either the defendant or victim.169  The judge could strike 
those jurors for cause in obvious cases, or lawyers could use their pe-
remptory challenges in subtle ones.170
Voir dire about bias is clearly no panacea.
 
171  Questioning a jury 
panel does not often result in defiant expressions or tearful confes-
sions of discrimination.172
 
166 See Laura A. Rousseau, Privacy and Jury Selection:  Does the Constitution Protect Prospective Ju-
rors from Personally Intrusive Voir Dire Questions?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. URB. POL’Y 287, 296 (2006) 
(citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)) (stating that trial judges have 
“broad discretion to determine the scope and breadth of the voir dire process”); Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (recognizing the broad role of the court 
with respect to voir dire); Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 422–24 (recognizing the importance of the 
discretion of the trial court with respect to voir dire); United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 
896 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Ariz. 1995) (asserting that trial judges have broad discretion to 
determine both the scope and breadth of the voir process). 
  Even those jurors conscious of their own 
discrimination will be loathe to admit to it in public, particularly in a 
167 See Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 421–31 (affirming petitioner’s conviction despite the trial judge’s 
refusal to allow defendant to thoroughly voir dire about the effect of pretrial publicity); 
see also State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022, 1027–28 (N.J. 1988) (finding that defendants have no 
constitutional right to attorney-conducted voir dire). 
168 See Kathleen M. McKenna, Current Developments in Federal Civil Practice 2010, 821 PRAC. L. 
INST. 581, 586 (William P. Frank and John L. Gardiner eds., 2010) (stating that attorney-
conducted voir dire allows attorneys to explore biases based on in-depth knowledge about 
their own cases). 
169 See Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations:  The Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 45 (2005) (discussing use of voir dire to eliminate jurors with 
gender prejudices); see also McClain, supra note 155, at 306 (discussing the importance of 
voir dire to eliminating jury discrimination without violating Batson’s prohibition on pre-
suming such prejudice according to race). 
170 See discussion of bias against victims as a basis for a “for cause” strike infra Part III.B; see 
also Smith, supra note 162, at 566 n.201 (describing a personal anecdote in which the au-
thor admits that she and her co-counsel exercised almost all of their peremptory strikes to 
excuse whites, since they wanted as many black and Hispanic jurors as they could get to 
help their defendant’s case). 
171 Some research observers have been unimpressed with the effectiveness of attorneys’ ef-
forts to uncover juror bias.  See generally Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effec-
tive Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 710–17 (1991) (ex-
plaining that, based on statistical models, “an attorney’s ability to predict appears limited 
by a very low ceiling of precision”). 
172 See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 650–51 (1991) (arguing that voir dire “fails to elicit accurate or honest 
responses from potential jurors” and is therefore ineffective to root out prejudice”). 
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setting in which such views are anathema.173  The kind of blunt admis-
sions required to convince hesitant judges to dismiss a juror for cause 
are indeed rare.174
Nevertheless, a juror who does not proclaim bias may hint at it.  
Voir dire elicits a great deal of subtle information that can prove use-
ful to the exercise of peremptory challenges.
 
175  A juror may not proc-
laim a refusal to enforce rape laws because of gender bias, but might 
signal a general skepticism towards rape victims.176  A juror may not 
profess racism but may express concerns about racial “quotas.”177  Un-
less the judge allows the attorney to ask such questions, however, that 
potential bias will remain hidden, and lawyers will rely on far more 
superficial information.178
The Supreme Court has accorded defendants the constitutional 
right to voir dire jurors about potential racism if there is a significant 




173 Marshall & Smith, supra note 104, at 214; Johnson, supra note 20, at 1675 (discussing ten-
dency of potential jurors to hide their racist attitudes and the difficulty of penetrating this 
shield through voir dire). 
  In Ristaino v. Ross 
174 This is particularly true because judges tend to avoid striking for cause.  See Maureen A. 
Howard, Taking the High Road:  Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 414–15, 414 at n.230 (“Commentators have noted 
judicial reluctance to challenges for cause.  This may be particularly true in jurisdictions 
where judges are subject to reelection . . . [and] some judges engage in ‘aggressive reha-
bilitation,’ asking challenged jurors if they could set aside their experiences and feelings 
and follow the judge’s orders . . . .”); Julie A. Wright, Comment, Challenges For Cause Due to 
Bias or Prejudice:  The Blind Leading the Blind Down the Road of Disqualification, 46 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 825, 825–26 (1994); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994) 
(“Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon 
which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently.”). 
175 See People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (Cal. 1981) (holding that counsel should be al-
lowed to ask questions to elicit bias on voir dire).  The court in Williams recognized that:  
“[A]lthough we must presume that a potential juror is responding in good faith when he 
asserts broadly that he can judge the case impartially, further interrogation may reveal bi-
as of which he is unaware or which, because of his impaired objectivity, he reasonably be-
lieves he can overcome.  And although his protestations of impartiality may immunize 
him from a challenge for cause, they should not foreclose further reasonable questioning 
that might expose bias on which prudent counsel would base a peremptory challenge.”  
Id. at 873 (internal quotations omitted). 
176 In trials where gender is a subtler issue, voir dire is used to minimize gender discrimina-
tion by eliminating jurors who possess such prejudice.  Fowler, supra note 169, at 44–45. 
177 See Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender:  A Story of Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 209, 212 (2011) (stating that “many studies demonstrate a bias of white jurors 
against black defendants”). 
178 Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1974) (“[W]e do not allow the possibility of a 
false answer to serve as an excuse for not asking these questions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 
424 U.S. 589 (1976). 
179 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–98 (1976) (holding that, unlike Ham, the circums-
tances herein “did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect 
[the defendant’s] trial” and therefore the right to voir dire about racial prejudice did not 
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and Turner v. Murray, the Court held that both the Sixth Amendment 
and the Equal Protection Clause require voir dire on the subject of 
race discrimination when there is a clear risk of it affecting the ver-
dict.180
On the facts of this case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence 
prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in de-
ciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors speci-
fied under Virginia law [for the death penalty]. . . . More subtle, less con-
sciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in this 
case.  Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts 
of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.
  The Court explained the constitutional necessity of trumping 
the trial judge’s broad discretion about the scope of voir dire: 
181
A defendant who can meet the standard of showing a likelihood of 
racial discrimination can thus invoke a constitutional right to require 
voir dire on racism. 
 
2. Prosecutors Should Have a Corresponding Right to Voir Dire on the 
Subject of Bias 
The Court has never recognized a commensurate right for prose-
cutors to voir dire jurors about potential unlawful discrimination 
against victims; thus, a prosecutor asking permission for voir dire on 
bias would have to base the request on vague notions of fairness.  She 
would not have access to the defendant’s binding equal protection 
and Sixth Amendment guarantees.182  Prosecutors currently have no 
right to ask jurors about their racial attitudes in the trial of a hate 
crime.183
 
rise to “constitutional dimensions”); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 524–25, 
529 (1973) (holding that a known civil rights activist on trial for marijuana possession had 
right to voir dire prospective jurors on racial prejudice). 
  They have no right to question potential jurors in the trials 
180 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595–96; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.9 (1986).  The Court has 
not yet ruled on this subject in the context of gender. 
181 Turner, 476 U.S. at 35. 
182 As a practical matter, such a right might seem superfluous because a trial judge required 
to permit voir dire on discrimination for a defendant will probably give commensurate 
leeway to the prosecutor.  But in the very cases where the risk of discriminatory acquittal 
is highest, the defense lawyer may have no interest in requesting such voir dire.  A defen-
dant in a rape trial or a hate crime trial, would likely have no incentive to ask jurors about 
race or gender bias, and on the contrary, would want to keep bias against the victim hid-
den.  Thus prosecutors need an articulable right to demand voir dire to protect against 
discriminatory acquittal. 
183 See McClain, supra note 155, at 306 (discussing the importance of voir dire to eliminating 
jury discrimination without violating Batson’s prohibition on presuming such prejudice 
according to race). 
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of gender-based violence about their attitudes towards women and 
the permissibility of rape or domestic violence.184
The Court’s constitutional reasoning in Ristaino and Turner should 
apply to allow prosecutors to root out bias against victims because the 
Constitution prohibits both discriminatory convictions and acquit-
tals.
 
185  I have argued elsewhere that the Equal Protection Clause for-
bids juries from basing verdicts on race or gender discrimination.186  
When individuals serve on a jury, they function as state actors bound 
by the Equal Protection Clause, just as judges do when they decide a 
bench trial.187
A jury may no more acquit because of the race of the victim than 
the jury might convict because of the race of the defendant.  The Su-
preme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp that a jury may not render a 
death penalty verdict based on the defendant’s race, nor indeed, 
based upon a victim’s race.
 
188
The other source of authority in the voir dire cases, the Sixth 
Amendment, textually belongs to the defendant.  Yet the Supreme 
  As described above, prosecutors should 
have third-party standing to invoke the constitutional rights of victims 
to true equal protection, much as prosecutors already have third-
party standing to protect the public’s confidence in a fair system. 
 
184 See Fowler, supra note 169, at 8–10; see also Mark Soler, “A Woman’s Place . . .”:  Combating Sex-
Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 535, 568–70 (1975) 
(“The Supreme Court, however, has not applied the same constitutional test to sex dis-
crimination as it has to racial discrimination.”). 
185 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 103–16, 128 (outlining the argument as to why discriminatory 
convictions and acquittals violate the constitution). 
186 I do not argue that victims have a right to any particular verdict in a criminal trial, nor to 
a resulting panoply of procedural rights, but only that victims retain an equal protection 
right against acquittals based upon discrimination.  It is not necessary to imbue victims 
with procedural due process rights in order to protect their equal protection rights.  See 
id. at 109–11 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits state action 
based on discrimination). 
187 For discussion of state action of juries, see id. at 105–06.  Perhaps the most exciting and 
seemingly obvious insight produced by the recognition of discriminatory acquittal is that 
jurors must in fact be state actors.  The Supreme Court repeatedly states in dicta that jury 
verdicts are “a quintessential governmental body.”  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54 
(1992).  Jurors are selected and paid by the state to serve a governmental function, to ap-
ply the law to the evidence in a trial, and to render a verdict that will have the force of 
law.  In bench trials, we would never question the idea that a judge performing these 
same functions would be governed by the Equal Protection Clause. 
188 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that such discrimination 
treats victims and defendants as a “faceless, undifferentiated mass” rather than individual, 
unique human beings, thus resulting in a devaluation of the lives of black victims (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  McCleskey “held that the jury system and the fair cross-
section principle were designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sen-
tence based on the race of the victim.”  Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 n.8 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Court has often described the right to an “impartial jury” as belong-
ing more broadly to society as a whole.189  “Although the constitution-
al guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the State, the goal 
it expresses is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants:  nei-
ther the defendant nor the State should be favored.”190  The defen-
dant does not have a right to a jury that tips towards his cause, but to 
an impartial jury.191  As such, courts have equal obligations to root out 
bias towards either side.192
A truly “impartial jury” could not allow discrimination against the 
victim to be the deciding factor in an acquittal.  The interplay of the 
Sixth Amendment and equal protection rights requires, as a bare 




Our criminal justice system may ignore the equal protection rights 
of victims because they lack a direct, obvious remedy within the crim-
inal justice system,
  If a potential juror displays bias that would lead to convic-




189 See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49–50 (noting, among other rationales regarding the pub-
lic as a whole, that “as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a conviction 
in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred in jury selection, so is public confi-
dence undermined where a defendant, assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory 
strikes, obtains an acquittal”). 
 but it has no excuse for refusing to protect vic-
190 Holland, 493 U.S. at 483. 
191 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Constitution guarantees a right only to an impartial jury, not to a jury composed 
of members of a particular race or gender.”). 
192 Scholars have struggled for decades to come up with more results-oriented mechanisms 
to guarantee jury diversity, perhaps with a quota system.  They have focused on the no-
tion of juries as representative of the defendant rather than as representative of a fair 
cross-section of the community as a whole.  See Harold A. McDougall, Note, The Case for 
Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (proposing proportional representational 
schemes for minorities in petit juries); Johnson, supra note 20, at 1698–99 (proposing at 
least three jurors be “racially similar” to the defendant); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, 
AND AMERICAN LAW 467–68 (5th ed. 2004) (proposing a 50-50 “split jury” as basis for dis-
cussion).  Acknowledging the issue of discriminatory acquittal, however, throws a signifi-
cant wrench in such proposals.  Why would we create a system that guarantees represen-
tation for the defendants charged with murdering Emmett Till and beating Rodney King 
without also providing jury representation based on the race of the victim?  Instead, the 
Court’s existing focus on jury diversity as representative of the community makes sense as 
a protection of the broader equal protection rights at stake. 
193 See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 109–11. 
194 Several scholars argue convincingly that double jeopardy does not, and should not, ban 
the reversal of an acquittal obtained through fundamental defects in the judicial process, 
whether through witness tampering or misconduct by defense counsel.  See, e.g., Thomas 
DiBiagio, Judicial Equity:  An Argument for Post-Acquittal Retrial When the Judicial Process is 
Fundamentally Defective, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 78–79 (1996).  The Supreme Court did 
not first hold that prosecutorial appeal violated double jeopardy until 1896, and then it 
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tims with the instrumental protections against jury discrimination.  
Prosecutors should be given the right and responsibility to exercise 
those protections.  They should have the same rights to voir dire 
about bias as do defendants, based on the same reasoning.195
B. The Supreme Court Should Expand Voir Dire Rights for Both Sides 
 
It is not enough to apply the defendant’s rights to voir dire on 
discrimination to prosecutors without also attempting to broaden 
those rights.  The Supreme Court frequently acknowledges the im-
portance of voir dire in dicta, yet strangely limits the constitutional 
right to inquire into bias, leaving the scope of voir dire almost entire-
ly to the discretion of trial judges.196  Worse yet, the Court seems de-
termined to solve the problem of jury discrimination by pretending 
that it rarely exists,197
 
reversed positions on the subject until finally banning prosecutorial appeals and retrials 
in a closely-divided opinion.  Id. at 83–89.  I do not grapple here with the possibility of re-
versing course again and allowing prosecutorial appeals, though I believe it is worth con-
sidering for the reasons discussed in these articles. 
 and thus discourages trial judges from exercis-
ing their discretion to allow voir dire about discrimination.  The 
Court should strengthen the right to voir dire about bias, and should 
apply it to protect against both discriminatory conviction and acquit-
tal. 
195 On a pragmatic note, one reason that courts have not articulated procedural rights to 
protect against discriminatory acquittal is because prosecutors cannot appeal acquittals, 
and appellate courts do not generally have occasion to consider whether anyone in the 
courtroom can act to protect against jury discrimination.  Without guidance from appel-
late courts, trial judges will hesitate to recognize new procedural rights that might lead to 
reversal of a conviction.  But these problems are not insurmountable.  The procedural 
protections I propose can reach appellate courts in either of two ways.  If prosecutors can 
persuade a few trial judges to apply protections to prevent jury discrimination, defendants 
will challenge those protections on appeal, creating further guidance for other courts.  
Conversely, prosecutors in some states could appeal the denial of such rights with an in-
terlocutory appeal, as the State of Georgia did in McCollum.  Federal law would not allow 
such an interlocutory appeal.  18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006). 
196 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); see generally Babcock, supra note 75, at 
551 (describing the importance of voir dire in rooting out potential discrimination); 
Crawford & Patterson, supra note 150, at 662 (“Opening up the questioning process is 
likely to enhance the quality of juror screening without doing violence to the fair trial 
ideal.”). 
197 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 154 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In Batson, however, this Court began to depart from 
Strauder by holding that, without some actual showing, suppositions about the possibility 
that jurors may harbor prejudice have no legitimacy.”); see Carter, supra note 34, at 446–
47 (noting that the Justices in McCleskey purposefully chose to ignore the pervasive prob-
lem of “racialism” in American society that pervades juries because the cost of acknowl-
edgement is too high). 
1152 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
As described above, if a defense lawyer requests voir dire designed 
to expose any bias in the jury pool, the Supreme Court only requires a 
trial judge to grant the request if there is a “significant likelihood” 
that prejudice will likely affect jurors.198  The problem lies in the 
Court’s extremely limited definition of when a risk of jury discrimina-
tion exists.199
Empirical evidence shows a serious risk of racial discrimination 
against defendants (and an even greater risk of racial discrimination 
against victims) in every trial, but particularly in trials of interracial 
crimes.
 
200  In Ristaino, however, the Court held that such bias cannot 
be presumed, even when the case involves an interracial crime.201  In-
stead the trial must clearly involve an element of race, for example, a 
prosecution for a racially-motivated crime.202
Only in the context of the death penalty does an interracial crime 
require permission to voir dire on bias.
 
203  In Turner v. Murray, a black 
defendant charged with murdering a white victim was not allowed to 
voir dire the jury about potential bias, and the resulting jury con-
victed him and sentenced him to death.204
 
198 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596–98 (1976) (holding that the interracial nature of the 
crime did not require voir dire about racial prejudice because “[t]he circumstances thus 
did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the defen-
dant’s] trial”); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973) (finding that a known 
civil rights activist on trial for marijuana possession had a right to voir dire on racial pre-
judice).  To give an example of how unduly limited the right remains for defendants, the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction in which white supremacist defendants accused of de-
facing a synagogue and assaulting non-whites in a park were not permitted to voir dire ju-
rors about bias because those issues were not clearly relevant to the trial.  United States v. 
Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991). 
  The Supreme Court re-
199 The Court grants trial judges great discretion on whether to voir dire about bias broadly 
defined.  In Mu’Min v. Virginia, for example, the Court upheld the defendant’s convic-
tion despite the refusal of the trial judge to allow thorough voir dire about the jury’s ex-
posure to pretrial publicity.  500 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1991). 
200 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries:  A 
Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant is 
Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1531–32 (2004); William J. Bow-
ers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White:  An Em-
pirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 171, 259–61 (2001). 
201 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596–98 (holding that a criminal defendant does not have a constitu-
tional right to voir dire about racial bias based solely on the interracial nature of the 
charged crime). 
202 See id. at 596–97 (explaining that in Ham, “[r]acial issues . . . were inextricably bound up 
with the conduct of the trial” because the defendant was a prominent civil rights leader 
whose position as such was “likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of 
the jury might harbor”). 
203 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S 28, 36–38 (1986). 
204 Id. at 29. 
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versed the sentence but not the murder conviction, though the ver-
dicts were rendered by the same jury.205  The Court’s unusual parsing 
of the right to voir dire led to the classic Brennan response:  “King 
Solomon did not, in fact, split the baby in two, and had he done so, I 
suspect that he would be remembered less for his wisdom than for his 
hardheartedness.”206  The majority nevertheless did split the baby, 
and reversed the death penalty verdict, but upheld the unexamined 
jury’s murder conviction.207
Is a constitutional right really necessary to convince trial judges of 
the importance of voir dire on bias?  The Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, has invited judges to permit voir dire about racial bias, even 
when not required to do so, as “the wiser course.”
 
208  Because judges 
have vast discretion to make decisions about the scope of voir dire, 
they also have the authority to permit questioning about potential ju-
ror bias against either defendant or victim.209  If the trial judge can be 
persuaded of the importance of voir dire on the subject of bias, there 
need be no constitutional demand.210
My own experience, however, is that judges rarely do allow such 
questioning, for reasons rooted in the Supreme Court’s attitude to-




Judges who severely limit the breadth of voir dire often do so be-
cause of discomfort with the very nature of using an adversarial 
process to pick a “fair jury.”  Our system does not actually task lawyers 
with selecting an impartial jury, but rather attempts to harness self-
interest and the adversarial process to eliminate the extremes on ei-
ther side.
  There is a fundamental disconnect between the ways 
that many judges perceive jury selection, and the realities of an adver-
sarial and balanced self-interested process. 
212
 
205 Id. at 37–38. 
  Lawyers do not generally believe in the mythical creature 
of an “impartial juror.” Instead, they try their best to distinguish be-
206 Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
207 The Court provided a somewhat more stringent requirement on federal courts as a mat-
ter of supervisory authority.  In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, a plurality of the Court held 
that any crime involving alleged interracial violence invokes the right to voir dire about 
potential prejudices, though a non-violent or victimless crime does not. 451 U.S. 182, 192 
(1981). 
208 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9. (1976). 
209 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189–90. 
210 Id. at 191 n.7. 
211 For examples of trial courts refusing to conduct voir dire on racial bias, see Barry P. 
Goode, Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity:  The Range and Limits of Voir Dire, 92 KY. L.J. 
601, 676–81 (2004). 
212 See Babcock, supra note 75, at 559–62. 
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tween those jurors partial to their side and those jurors partial to the 
other side.213  Judges, in contrast, are more likely to have an aspira-
tional view of impartiality as an identifiable, and quite common, hu-
man characteristic.214
The nature of the jury selection requires lawyers to seek the jury 
most favorable to their cause.
 
215  But for judges for whom that self-
interest registers as unseemly, the kind of voir dire necessary to un-
cover partiality seems unnecessary and even harmful.216  In-depth voir 
dire seems an unnecessary violation of privacy.217  Voir dire on the 
subject of juror bias seems like a rude accusation.  For these judges, it 
would almost suffice to look jurors in the eye and ask them, with 
great solemnity, if they can be impartial.218
Judges tend to have even more discomfort with voir dire on the 
subject of discrimination because current doctrine suggests that rais-
ing the issue will create bias where it did not otherwise exist.
 
219  In Ris-
taino, the Supreme Court literally forbade trial judges from presum-
ing too readily that the jury might indulge in racial bias.220  The idea 
itself seems too destructive, no matter how empirically proven.  “In 
our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considera-
tions militate against the divisive assumption—as a per se rule—that 
justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the 
accident of birth, or the choice of religion.”221
 
213 Id. 
  The Court currently 
insists on the aspirational and counterfactual view that jurors are un-
214 See Bennett, supra note 102, at 158–60. 
215 One might object that prosecutors lack a client, and thus do not have permission to be so 
self-interested.  Yet by definition, a prosecutor bringing a case to trial is supposed to be 
acting in his or her own interests, and is psychologically motivated to do so, because he or 
she believes the case is just.  In that situation, finding jurors partial to believing the gov-
ernment’s witnesses seems to the prosecutor to be “doing justice.” 
216 See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 227 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951) (explaining, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, that “[i]t is of the nature of 
our deepest antipathies that often we do not admit them even to ourselves; but when that 
is so, nothing but an examination, utterly impracticable in a courtroom, will disclose 
them” and concluding that “[n]o such examination is required,” because “[i]f trial by 
jury is not to break down by its own weight, it is not feasible to probe more than the up-
per levels of a juror’s mind”). 
217 Id. at 228. 
218 See Bennett, supra note 102, at 160. 
219 Id. at 158. 
220 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 590 (1976) (holding that there is no constitutional re-
quirement “that a question specifically directed to racial prejudice be asked during voir 
dire” anytime there is a confrontation in a criminal trial between people of different rac-
es). 
221 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 50 n.8 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Ristaino, 
424 U.S. at 596 n.8) (emphasis omitted). 
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biased, and worse yet, the Court actually forbids recognition of the 
realities of jury discrimination. 
Trial judges thus receive quite mixed signals about, on the one 
hand, their obligations to root out jury discrimination, and on the 
other hand, the unconstitutionality of assuming that jury discrimina-
tion exists.222  The Supreme Court requires that trial judges constantly 
attest that they are ignoring the elephant in the room.  Worse, the 
Court worries that to mention the elephant in the room will make 
everyone else see it for the first time.  As Justice Powell explained ex-
plicitly:  “Asking such a question [about prejudice] in the absence of 
circumstances that make clear a need for it could well have the nega-
tive effect of suggesting to the jurors that race somehow is relevant to 
the case.”223  The Court’s frequent rhetoric about the danger of in-
troducing the subject of juror prejudice makes judges quite nervous 
about doing so, as if to name the issue will create it.224
The Court blunts the most useful weapons in its battle against the 
race and gender bias that clearly infects the criminal justice system, 
by denying that obvious fact.  Its entire approach to tackling the ter-
rible problem of jury discrimination, a problem so clearly proven by 
the empirical evidence presented in McCleskey v. Kemp, is to mandate 
a state of denial.
 
225  To recognize the proven realities of endemic jury 
discrimination would prove too “divisive.”226
Even in the context of the Court’s colorblindness, surely the least 
controversial tool available to root out bias from juries is to question 
potential jurors on the subject before seating them.  In the Batson 
line of cases, the Court banned lawyers from assuming that a juror’s 





222 Bennett, supra note 102, at 158 (“[J]udge-dominated voir dire . . . actually perpetuate[s] 
legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish.”).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 
485 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Mass. 1985) (explaining that racial inquiry “may activate latent ra-
cial bias in certain prospective jurors or may insult others without uncovering evidence of 
bias in hard-core bigots who refuse to acknowledge their prejudice” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
  The Court pointed to the possibility of voir dire 
223 Turner, 476 U.S. at 48 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
224 See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596, n.8 (rejecting a rule that would have allowed questions on 
racial prejudice to be asked anytime participants in the case were of different races).  This 
logic is similar to the idea that it is sex education that makes kids think about sex. 
225 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–97 (1987) (discussing the Baldus study presented 
to the Court, which showed significant statistical evidence revealing an increased likelih-
ood that a defendant would receive the death penalty if convicted of killing a white per-
son rather than a black person). 
226 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976). 
227 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (“Whether the race gene-
rality employed by litigants to challenge a potential juror derives from open hostility or 
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as a way to determine bias through individual inquiry rather than 
race or gender stereotypes.228
Voir dire makes stereotypes less tempting by offering more accu-
rate and individualized information about jurors.
  Yet the Court has not given litigants 
that right.  Had the Supreme Court more broadly defined the right 
to voir dire about bias, it could have cured the problems it worried 
about. 
229  It replaces re-
liance on a juror’s race and gender as proxies for belief with more sa-
lient information.230  If lawyers can instead ask jurors specific 
questions about their beliefs, lawyers will find it both possible and de-
sirable to rely on other factors.231
Broad voir dire, thus, harnesses the power of self-interest to avoid 
stereotyping.
  The more information derived, the 
more complex and individualized potential jurors will seem. 
232  Lawyers do not seek to skew the demographics of the 
jury for the sake of doing so.  Lawyers seek a jury more favorable to 
their cause and less favorable to the other side’s cause.233
 
from some hidden and unarticulated fear, neither motive entitles the litigant to cause in-
jury to the excused juror.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 n.9, 139 n.11 
(1994) (asserting that statistical evidence linking gender and belief was “conjured up” 
and a “quasi-empirical claim”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1990) (calling the idea 
that race predicts belief “the very stereotype the law condemns”). 
  They have a 
228 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143–44 (“If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about 
potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions about a par-
ticular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise.  Voir dire provides a means of disco-
vering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise their 
peremptory challenges intelligently.” (emphasis omitted)). 
229 Id. 
230 See United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., 
writing for those who would reverse) (describing the importance of allowing broad voir 
dire on issues of potential prejudice in order to avoid Batson error). 
231 See Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury:  The 
Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 55 n.301 (1988) (“Pro-
secutorial inquiry into the existence of specific bias, rather than merely striking because 
of broad assumptions based on race, age, or status, actually promotes the accuracy of pe-
remptory challenges.”). 
232 Colbert, supra note 22, at 121 n.584 (“For jury selection to be meaningful, the defense 
attorney must conduct the voir dire.”); see generally Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Bat-
son v. Kentucky:  A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 705 (1993) (arguing that voir dire can be used to combat racial 
prejudice in jury trials); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of 
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 46 (1993) (promoting voir dire as a me-
chanism for fighting racial prejudice in jury trials); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!:  A 
Proposal To Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1099, 1127–28 (1994) (agreeing with the position that voir dire can effectively miti-
gate juror racial prejudice); McClain, supra note 155, at 300 (concurring in the position 
that voir dire is a desirable tool for combating racial prejudice in juries). 
233 See Babcock, supra note 75, at 559–62 (discussing techniques lawyers have used to find a 
jury that will most likely decide in their client’s favor). 
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tremendous vested interest in getting the guesswork of peremptory 
challenges right.234
Instead, the Supreme Court essentially mandates a state of denial 
about the possibility of jury discrimination.  Lawyers may neither use 
a juror’s race as a proxy for the risk that they will discriminate,
 
235 nor 
may lawyers attempt to gather more information through individual 
voir dire about whether a juror tends to discriminate.236  The Su-
preme Court has grappled with jury discrimination by simply pre-
tending by judicial fiat that it no longer exists.237  When the defendant 
in McCleskey presented evidence showing endemic racial discrimina-
tion by juries in death penalty cases, particularly based on the race of 
the victim, the Court blithely pointed to Batson and Ristaino as the so-
lution.238
Before arguing to extend this flawed right to victims, I would 
strengthen it.  There is no reason not to allow lawyers to voir dire 
about bias in any case.  Given the Sixth Amendment imperative of an 
impartial jury and the Equal Protection Clause prohibition on jury 
discrimination, we should use every available tool to root out uncons-
titutional discrimination.  The Court’s argument that this tool should 
be made available only when discrimination is a “significant issue” ig-





234 The systemic hope is that with dueling peremptory challenges (usually weighted towards 
the defendant in a criminal case), the remaining jurors will prove the least biased.  See 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (explaining that the function of peremptory 
challenges is “not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the 
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evi-
dence placed before them, and not otherwise”). 
 
235 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104–05 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Exclusion of 
blacks from a jury, solely because of race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks 
are less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically the State’s case against a 
black defendant than it can be justified by the notion that blacks lack the intelligence, 
experience or moral integrity to be entrusted with that role.” (internal quotations and ci-
tations omitted)). 
236 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1976).  Ironically, the colorblind logic of Ristaino 
makes it more likely that lawyers will violate the colorblind logic of Batson, creating a nev-
er-never land of denial. 
237 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). 
238 Id. at 309 n.30.  See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 n.8 (1990) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting ) (“[McCleskey] held that the jury system and the fair-cross-section principles were 
designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sentence based on the race 
of the victim.”). 
239 Goode, supra note 211, at 677–79. 
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C. Prosecutors’ Protection of Victims Does Not Prejudice Defendants 
If it were true that raising the issue of potential discrimination 
creates it, then extending the right to prosecutors might prove pre-
judicial to defendants.  But empirical evidence does not support the 
Court’s contention, and in fact, the contrary seems to prove true.  
Challenging assumptions about race and gender stereotypes has de-
monstrable impact on reducing stereotypes.240  Indeed, discriminatory 
acquittals represent the other side of the same coin as discriminatory 
convictions.241
CONCLUSION 
  Sending a message during voir dire (and during the 
rest of the trial) that jury discrimination is unacceptable against ei-
ther the defendant or victim is a mutually reinforcing message.  It 
serves the legitimate purposes of both sides. 
Prosecutors should have a constitutionally-based right to voir dire 
about bias against victims of crime in order to actualize their duty to 
“do justice.”  Prosecutors have a crucial and unacknowledged role in 
fighting discriminatory acquittals in order to provide true equal pro-
tection of the law to minorities and women.  Unless we give prosecu-
tors the tools they need to fight these battles, we will continue to suf-
fer endemic rates of jury discrimination against victims. 
Discriminatory acquittal has enormous consequences.  When ju-
ries freed the killers of Medgar Evars and Emmett Till, they gave very 
public permission for racial violence.  When conviction rates for rape 
or the death penalty correlate highly with the race of the victim, ju-
ries send a message about the permissibility of violence against black 
people.  When juries put female victims on trial for their obedience 
to gender rules before considering the conviction of a defendant for 
rape or domestic violence, they perpetuate the use of gender-based 
violence to regulate all women’s behavior. 
Prosecutors should have a right to examine jurors for such bias 
because a juror who expresses unconstitutional bias against a crime 
victim should be excused for cause or, at a minimum, struck with a 
peremptory challenge.  Voir dire on prejudice is decidedly imperfect, 
but it is the most effective available tool to seek out racism and sex-
 
240 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality:  Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 409–17 (2007) (collecting results of empirical studies on 
how confronting racial and gender biases helps to dissipate them and helps to improve 
the distortion of facts according to race and gender stereotypes). 
241 Tetlow, supra note 3, at 103–16 (drawing parallels between discriminatory acquittals and 
discriminatory convictions). 
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ism.  At the moment, prosecutors lack any constitutional language to 
enforce their institutional role in preventing discriminatory acquittal. 
Further, the constitutional right to voir dire about bias must be 
expanded for both prosecutors and defendants.  The Court’s inex-
plicable restrictiveness of this right has not received nearly enough 
attention given its enormous consequences.  The Court limits the 
most important tool to seek an impartial jury, the chance to inquire 
individually of jurors about their discriminatory attitudes and beliefs.  
It does so by pretending that introducing the subject of prejudice 
during voir dire might actually create such prejudice, and it does so 
by positing that it would be “divisive” to assume that such bias occurs 
frequently.242
  
  This application of aspirational colorblindness creates a 
fundamental barrier to grappling with the proven realities of endem-














242 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976). 
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